Essays In Urban And Real Estate Economics by Gorback, Caitlin S
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 
2020 
Essays In Urban And Real Estate Economics 
Caitlin S. Gorback 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gorback, Caitlin S., "Essays In Urban And Real Estate Economics" (2020). Publicly Accessible Penn 
Dissertations. 3949. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3949 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3949 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Essays In Urban And Real Estate Economics 
Abstract 
This dissertation studies how the built environment responds to increasingly interconnected markets. The 
first chapter studies how improvements in local accessibility influence cities' distributions of economic 
activity. Exploiting UberX's entry interacted with a location's prior accessibility, I measure how local 
economic activity responds to changes in access. After ridesharing's entry, restaurant net creation 
doubles in previously inaccessible locations, from 5% to 10%. As these areas open up, the median house 
price rises by 4% and rent by 1%. I quantify the impacts of these changes on welfare using a spatial 
equilibrium framework. Resident welfare depends on the trade-off between accessibility and amenity 
benefits versus housing costs. In the post-period, all residents benefit from ridesharing's entry. 
Homeowners are willing to pay $1,060 per year for ridesharing's entry, while renters are willing to pay 
$430, as they do not realize equity gains. The second chapter studies how interconnected capital markets 
allow mobile global capital to flow into immobile local assets. We document how international capital 
impacts U.S. housing markets. Other countries introduced foreign-buyer taxes meant to deter Chinese 
housing investment beginning in 2011. We first show house prices grew 8pp more in U.S. zipcodes with 
high foreign-born Chinese populations after 2011. Second, we use the international tax policy changes as 
a U.S. housing demand shock and estimate local house price and quantity elasticities with respect to 
international capital. We find that a 1% increase in foreign capital raises house prices by 0.6%, and 
housing supply by 0.004%. Finally, we use the two elasticities to construct a new local house price 
elasticity of supply. We find that for the largest 100 CBSAs, supply elasticities average 0.1 and vary 











Amenities, Elasticities, Foreign Capital, House Prices, Ridesharing, Transportation 
Subject Categories 
Economics 
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3949 





For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
m
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the





Martin Bucksbaum Professor of Real Estate
Graduate Group Chairperson
Nancy R. Zhang
Ge Li and Ning Zhao Professor, Professor of Statistics
Dissertation Committee:
Gilles Duranton, Dean's Chair in Real Estate Professor
Todd Sinai, David B. Ford Professor, Professor of Real Estate
Benjamin J. Keys, Rowan Family Foundation Associate Professor of Real Estate
Jessie Handbury, Assistant Professor of Real Estate








To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I have many people to thank for their support, guidance, and encouragement over the many
years it took to put together this dissertation and complete my degree. I would not have
made it to the finish line of what was often a labor of love, but much of the time just labor,
without my advisors, mentors, friends, colleagues, and family.
First, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my advisors and mentors. Joseph Gyourko, Gilles
Duranton, Todd Sinai, Benjamin Keys, and Jessie Handbury were all integral parts of my
dissertation committee. Each of them provided a different point of view and mentoring
style to help move me forward in my research. I can’t imagine accomplishing such a huge
task without your guidance.
Joe has one of the best senses for whether questions will be important; without his perspec-
tive, I probably would have written a much less interesting dissertation. Gilles is a master
of constructive criticism, and with his encouragement I took on a modeling challenges I
otherwise would have left alone. Todd can take any new question and cut right to the
heart of it; I’ve tried to learn from Todd’s example, to simplify and clarify my thinking.
Ben taught me to fail fast, fail hard, and to back up and pivot; learning to back up out
of the weeds ensured I learned to push myself forward, even when it felt like I was going
sideways. Finally, Jessie never let me leave a meeting confused or disheartened; even when
my progress was marginal at best, Jessie reminded me that the math doesn’t always work
at first.
Beyond my dissertation committee, there are numerous other faculty members and col-
leagues I wish to thank. Thanks to Fernando Ferreira, Nina Harari, Robert Inman, Ben-
jamin Lockwood, Corinne Low, Diego Puga, Maisy Wong, and the seminar participants in
Wharton’s Applied Economics Workshop and BEPP 900 Student Seminar for their advice
and input. Trevor Woolley and Lin Fan provided excellent research assistance. I appreciate
the helpful feedback I’ve received from participants during presentations at the UEA/IEB
iii
Summer School in Urban Economics 2018, the EMUA and UEA 2019 meetings, and the
2019 OSU PhD Conference on Real Estate and Housing. Thanks to Ernst Schaumburg and
Andreas Fuster for helping me grow as a researcher while at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. Finally, a huge thanks to Charlie Becker, perhaps the first economics professor
to see my potential as a researcher; I’ve come a long way since we began studying trailer
park economics in 2009!
My dissertation would not have been possible without generous financial support from the
Jay H. Baker Retail Center at the Wharton School, the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy
at the University of Pennsylvania, the Real Estate Research Institute and the Lincoln Land
Institute.
One of the most important sources of support and encouragement throughout my time
at Wharton came from my amazing cohort: Jiayi Bao, Bo Cheng, Laurence Go, Jennie
Huang, Hideto Koizumi, Colin Sullivan, and Hongyu Xiao. I’d like to thank Bo for being
an amazing friend and roommate; we went through some stuff, man! And Jennie, one of
my closest friends, colleagues, former roommate, and former cubicle mate. Herd forever!
Thanks also to my volleyball teammates, Jake Krimmel and Colin Sullivan; sometimes you
just need to smack something after a bad research day. Thanks to Sunny and Rachel for
brightening many a happy hour. Finally, thanks to Rhiannon Jerch and Ellen Fu, two
invaluable colleagues (and coauthors?) in urban and real estate economics I can go to for
research advice and questions, no matter how small. Outside of school, thanks to Ritu for
encouraging me to take breaks for myself.
Looking beyond Philadelphia, I’d like to thank my family. Hannah, you have been my rock
these past few years. I’m grateful for our many late night phone calls and our long distance
road trips, and am so proud of you for starting out strong on your own graduate school
journey! To my mom and dad, you encouraged me to read all of the books, to ask any
question, and to shoot for the stars. Much of my success is thanks to your belief in me.
iv
A huge thank you to my husband, Enrique. I’m sure at this point, you could recite this
entire dissertation back to me verbatim. I’ve found in you a truly supportive partner who
understands why one makes the crazy decision to get a PhD, the at times all-consuming
nature of research, and the desire to keep questioning. I hope we continue exploring the
world together, skiing, hiking, and importantly, eating. I can’t imagine a better person to
try and academically co-locate with!
Finally, my dog Petri has been such a good boy throughout this process, even when I got
home too late to go to the park.
v
ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN URBAN AND REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS
Caitlin Gorback
Joseph Gyourko
This dissertation studies how the built environment responds to increasingly interconnected
markets. The first chapter studies how improvements in local accessibility influence cities’
distributions of economic activity. Exploiting UberX’s entry interacted with a location’s
prior accessibility, I measure how local economic activity responds to changes in access.
After ridesharing’s entry, restaurant net creation doubles in previously inaccessible loca-
tions, from 5% to 10%. As these areas open up, the median house price rises by 4% and
rent by 1%. I quantify the impacts of these changes on welfare using a spatial equilibrium
framework. Resident welfare depends on the trade-off between accessibility and amenity
benefits versus housing costs. In the post-period, all residents benefit from ridesharing’s
entry. Homeowners are willing to pay $1,060 per year for ridesharing’s entry, while renters
are willing to pay $430, as they do not realize equity gains. The second chapter studies
how interconnected capital markets allow mobile global capital to flow into immobile local
assets. We document how international capital impacts U.S. housing markets. Other coun-
tries introduced foreign-buyer taxes meant to deter Chinese housing investment beginning
in 2011. We first show house prices grew 8pp more in U.S. zipcodes with high foreign-born
Chinese populations after 2011. Second, we use the international tax policy changes as a
U.S. housing demand shock and estimate local house price and quantity elasticities with
respect to international capital. We find that a 1% increase in foreign capital raises house
prices by 0.6%, and housing supply by 0.004%. Finally, we use the two elasticities to con-
struct a new local house price elasticity of supply. We find that for the largest 100 CBSAs,
supply elasticities average 0.1 and vary between 0.02 and 0.7, suggesting that local housing
markets are inelastic in the short run with substantial spatial heterogeneity.
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CHAPTER 1 : Your Uber has Arrived: Ridesharing and the Redistribution of
Economic Activity
1.1. Introduction
Transportation technology effects the spatial distribution of economic activity in cities.
Knowing this, governments have spent hundreds of billions of public dollars investing in large
infrastructure projects. As a result, highways, commuter rail, and subways have allowed
cities to expand their spatial footprints, allocating more land to production in the center
and residences in the suburbs. The goal of these projects is often to improve accessibility
in cities. Recently, the private sector introduced a new transportation technology, in the
form of ridesharing, that has the potential to reshape our cities.
This paper looks at how ridesharing impacts cities. Ridesharing services such as Uber and
Lyft provide on-demand, point-to-point travel, and have the potential to reshape our cities
by improving accessibility. Ridesharing services remove the fixed cost of owning a car,
allow more flexible routes than public transit, and expand taxi services by hailing via online
platform rather than physically searching for a ride. In contrast to changes in access due to
large infrastructure projects, ridesharing arrives without planning or prior announcement
from public officials. In addition, it arrives in every location within a city, instead of a along
single new route. This variation affords clean, short-run estimation of the impact of access
on economic activity.
In this paper, I explore how residents value this improvement in access introduced via
ridesharing. As zipcodes become more accessible, customers can travel to them more eas-
ily. This enables firms to take advantage of lower rents in previously inaccessible areas,
especially those firms sensitive to consumers’ travel choices, such as restaurants, which are
important urban consumption amenities. The improvements in access and amenities beg
the question of whether more fundamental neighborhood changes, such as gentrification,
are afoot. While the short run demographic responses show no evidence of displacement or
1
residential resorting, transit-inaccessible zipcodes already see house price growth consistent
with local redevelopment.
First, to measure UberX’s impact on cities, I compare economic outcomes in accessible
and inaccessible zipcodes within cities, pre- and post-ridesharing. I use variation in pre-
period inaccessibility, which differs within cities and across zipcodes, interacted with the
staggered entry of the UberX platform into cities in a difference-in-differences design.1 This
natural experiment measures how economic activity, specifically restaurants and housing
costs, responds to differential improvements in access induced by ridesharing. The design
is also expanded to an event-study setting to observe how these responses evolve over time.
The reduced-form results show that economic activity, as measured by restaurant net cre-
ation, house prices, and rents, increases relatively more in inaccessible zipcodes than in
their accessible peers. After ridesharing’s entry into a city, inaccessible zipcodes add 0.75
new restaurants per year more than their accessible peers. This doubles the restaurant
net creation rate from 5% of stock in the pre-period to 10% in the post-period; suggesting
the supply of local consumption amenities are highly elastic with respect to access. As
previously inaccessible zipcodes enjoy improved access and new amenities, house prices rise
by 4% and rents by 1% for the median zipcode. These results show no evidence of pre-
trends, are not driven by general urbanization or gentrification, and are robust to a variety
of sample definitions and inaccessibility metrics.
Second, to measure how residents value improvements in access, I write down a model
for welfare in order. The spatial equilibrium model contains a demand system in which
residents choose how much and where to consume private amenities (restaurants). The
UberX natural experiment shocks travel times and costs. Resident utility increases as
their zipcode of residence gains access and amenities, but declines as it realizes higher
housing costs. This framework allows me to weigh travel times, amenities, and housing
1UberX is a mobile app-based ridesharing platform in which a person can hail a vehicle via the app to come
to their location.
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costs in a unified framework to estimate how the distribution of welfare changes over time
by accessibility status.
After ridesharing, all residents gain more from improvements in access and amenities than
they lose due to increasing housing costs. Homeowners actually see their user costs fall,
and are willing to pay $1,060 for ridesharing’s entry. Renters realize higher rents and do
not benefit as much; they are nonetheless willing to pay $430 a year, or $36 a month
for ridesharing and all of its associated benefits. Residents of accessible locations, both
homeowners and renters, are willing to pay 0.5% more than their inaccessible peers. For
homeowners, this is because they realize higher capital gains; even with lower house price
growth, prices are initially more expensive in accessible locations. Renters in accessible
locations are better off than their inaccessible peers as their rents do not rise as quickly.
Because this paper provides evidence that a short-run innovation in transportation technol-
ogy can reshape cities without the need for major infrastructure projects, it complements
the literature on access and economic activity. Generally, this literature finds that lowering
transit costs leads to urban growth and decentralization. Reduced-form work showing that
changes in access lead to dispersion of economic activity began with Baum-Snow (2007),
who showed that highways lead to suburbanization. More recent work on transportation has
exploited innovations independent of infrastructure, to measure the impact of taxi dereg-
ulation on congestion (Mangrum and Molnar, 2019), and the impact of congestion pricing
on travel patterns (Kreindler, 2018). Bridging those two strains, the reduced-form section
of this paper utilizes a modern change in technology independent of infrastructure to mea-
sure the impact of a transportation change on economic activity, rather than on travel or
congestion.
The welfare section of the paper complements the empirical spatial equilibrium litera-
ture, which has traditionally used long-term variation in access from infrastructure changes
(Heblich, Redding and Sturm, 2019; Monte et al., 2018; Tsivanidis, 2019). I adapt the
demand structure introduced by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), part of the empirical spatial equi-
3
librium framework that brought theory on non-monocentric cities (Ogawa and Fujita, 1976;
Rossi-Hansburg and Lucas, 2002), to a tractable empirical model. I modify the framework
for the short-run setting, shutting down the labor supply response and introducing demand
for consumption amenities to the consumer’s problem.
In studying how innovations in transportation impact the distribution of consumption,
this paper integrates the urban consumption literature and the access literature, which
emphasizes the distributions of jobs and residences. Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2000) posit
that cities add value not only in production, but also in consumption. Cities provide access
to nontradable services such as lawyers or restaurants, which increasingly drive urbanization
(Couture and Handbury, 2017). In addition, consumers value consumption density (Couture
(2019)) and segregate their consumption based on spatial and social frictions (Davis et
al., 2017). These papers rely on holding the commercial and transportation landscape
fixed, allowing people to sort and move across the city’s geography. In contrast, this paper
uses a complementary form of variation; I shock travel times, changing the distribution of
amenities, while holding residents fixed.
Finally, this paper joins a growing literature examining the Uber economy. Researchers
have studied consumer welfare (Cohen et al., 2016), and the labor supply of Uber drivers
(Chen et al., 2017; Hall and Krueger, 2016; Cook et al., 2018). In response to Uber’s
arrival, ambulance use has fallen (Moskatel and Slutsky, 2017), but traffic fatalities are on
the rise (Barrios, Hochberg and Yi, 2018). Hall, Palsson and Price (2018) show that Uber
can be a substitute or complement to a city’s transportation network, depending on its
extent. My paper furthers this finding; since Uber can substitute or complement current
travel modes, residents have more travel flexibility and consume in new places, leading to
aggregate increases in resident welfare.
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1.2. Institutional Background and Data
Before exploring how ridesharing redistributes economics activity in cities, it is useful to
understand how travel has changed since its introduction. This section uses travel survey
data from the National Household Travel Survey to show that the share of trips taken by
taxis or ridesharing is five times higher than in a world with only taxis. Furthermore,
travel modes have become increasingly specialized; residents switch from public transit
to ridesharing for social and recreational trips, and prefer public transit for work-related
trips. Zooming in on New York City, which offers extensive trip-level data over many years,
shows that take-up of ridesharing services in the outer boroughs is strongly correlated with
increased restaurant growth and housing rents.
Taken together, the travel data support studying how restaurant net creation has changed
in transit-inaccessible locations, as people switch from transit to ridesharing to consume.
Moving from the NYC case study to the national sample requires data pre- and post-
ridesharing in accessible and inaccessible locations for house prices, rents, and restaurant
establishment counts for a set of U.S. cities.
1.2.1. Travel Patterns and the Introduction of Ridesharing
While the United States is often considered primarily a driving country, U.S. travelers have
a variety of travel options. The National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) provides
detailed trip descriptions for approximately 1 million trips every 8 years, with the most
recent surveys in 2009 and 2017. Limiting the sample to trips taken in Core Based statistical
areas (CBSAs) with at least 2 million residents in 2010 yields approximately 291k trips in
2009, and 282k trips in 2017. Analysis of the two recent NHTS waves gives us insight into
how ridesharing is changing travel patterns in our biggest cities.
The NHTS classifies trips for work, social and recreational activities, shopping and other.2 I
2Analysis uses the “trippurp” variable. The more specific trip purpose variable, “whyto”, which gives the
travel purpose for a destination, independent of origin, changed the response options across the two waves,
introducing error when tracking travel purposes over time.
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define travel mode as driving private vehicle, taking public transit (including buses, subways,
commuter rail, street car, light rail), or hailing a taxi. In 2009, all taxi trips can only be
taken using the traditional taxi services, those one hails on the street or requests by calling
the dispatch station. In 2017, this field was updated to include Uber and Lyft. Using the
confidential NHTS data releases, one can determine whether a respondent’s home is within
a 5 mile radius of the CBSA’s city center.3
From 2009 to 2017, more people travel to work with public transit, but travel for fun with
ridesharing. Both public transit and ridesharing has increased at the expense of private
vehicles, and this is especially true in city centers. Table 1.1 describes the transportation
options observed in the NHTS trip data for 2009 and 2017. In 2009, 95% of travel used
private cars, decreasing to 83% in city centers. In city centers, this declined to 71% after the
introduction of ridesharing. Over the same period, people traveling to work rode more with
public transit, increasing from 25% to 39% of trips from central origins.4 For social and
recreational trips, travelers switched from driving private cars, especially so in city centers,
to using ridehailing, with these services growing from 2–10% of social and recreational trips.
Taken together, Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1 suggest travelers enjoy taking social and recre-
ational trips via ridesharing. Driving trips prior to ridesharing see about one-fifth of trips
devoted both to work and to social and recreational activities. In central locations after
ridesharing, driving trips are increasingly work-related. Public transit seems to have become
especially work-related, with the work share growing from 36% in 2009 to 50% in 2017. The
share of transit trips taken for fun has declined, especially so in city centers, from 24% to
14%. As driving and transit became more specialized for work trips, ridesharing trips have
become increasingly socially driven; social trip shares for taxi/ridesharing trips increase
from 13% to 46%. This revealed preference for ridesharing is not limited to areas with
previous taxi experience. Looking to Figure 1.1, we see that the cities best served by public
transit see a growth in centrally originated social trips using taxi or ridesharing services,
3City centers are defined by querying the latitude and longitude of a city in Google Maps.
429/34 US. cities with at least 2 million people have subways or lightrail systems, as listed in Table A.5.1.
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from 5% to 17%, but also cities without as much transit reliance saw growth from 0.1% to
3%. These are also cities in which ridesharing entered later, so their take-up is in earlier
stages.5
1.2.2. Case Study of the Impacts of Ridesharing: New York City
Not only did ridesharing introduce taxi services to cities lacking them in the pre-period,
it also filled in gaps within even the best-served public transit and taxi city, New York
City. While the yellow cab is one of the most recognizable symbols of the city, it is far
from omnipresent outside of Manhattan. Poorer and minority areas have long had trouble
hailing yellow cabs, to the extent that the city introduced green cabs in 2013 to provide
more options to outer borough residents.6 These areas are also much less densely served by
the subway systems, making them overall harder to access and leave using public transit.
Using a combination of publicly available data from the NYC Taxi & Limousine Com-
mission (TLC) as well as data acquired by Bialik, Flowers, Fischer-Baum and Mehta of
the website FiveThirtyEight using a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, one can
construct the time series of trip origination locations by car travel mode: yellow cab, green
cab, and Uber.789 UberX entered NYC in September, 2012, Lyft entered in July, 2014, and
UberPOOL, Uber’s carpooling service, entered in January 2015. The FOAI’d data covers all
Uber trips in NYC from April to September 2014, and from January to June 2015. Figure
1.2 shows how the take-up in ridesharing differs by borough. Panel (a) plots the Uber share
of all pickups, by borough. Uber makes up a much greater share of the ridesharing market in
outer boroughs, growing from 5 to nearly 40% of all trips by mid-2015. In contrast, Uber’s
market share in Manhattan grows at half the rate, still below 20% by mid-2015. Over the
5Of the sample of the 34 largest U.S. CBSA’s in 2010, San Francisco, New York City, Boston, Chicago, and
Washington, DC represent, respectively, the first, second, third, fourth, and eight city-level UberX entry
dates.
6Green cabs can pick up riders in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island, as well as in Manhattan
above W 110th St. and E 96th St.
7Data available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/trip_record_data.shtml
8Data available at https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/uber-tlc-foil-response/
9I drop trips to or from the major airports as we are interested in how ridesharing impacts social and
recreational trips.
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sample period, the total number of trips taken by any ridehailing service (yellow cab, green
cab or Uber) in Manhattan fell by about 3%, while the number of trips originated in the
outer boroughs rose by 69%, reflecting the differential improvement in access induced by
ridesharing.
The NHTS data suggest many of these trips to outer boroughs may be to restaurants.
Restaurants represent a particularly useful industry to study for two key reasons. First,
restaurant contribute to the consumption value we derive from cities (Glaeser, Kolko, Saiz,
2000; Couture, 2018; Couture and Handbury, 2019; Davis et al., 2019). Second, due to their
low start up costs, restaurants respond to changing local demand quickly, representing the
green shoots of responsiveness to ridesharing. In 2017, the NHTS data show that trips to
consume meals comprised 8% of all trips, and 54% of all social and recreational trips, up
from 6% of trips in 2009 and 34% of all social and recreational trips. Given that we travel
to restaurants often, explore a wide variety of restaurant cuisines, and start up costs are
low relative to other industries, we would expect new restaurants to open up in locations
previously hard to access using public transit.
TheCounty Business Patterns provides zipcode level annual data on restaurants, among
other industries. This data tracks the number of establishments by industry and employ-
ment size class.10 After ridesharing’s entry, we should observe more restaurants enter in
previously hard-to-reach areas, so I construct a net creation variable as the change in the
stock of restaurants over two years. For example, given a restaurant stock of 8 establish-
ments in 2011, followed by 10 establishments in 2012, net creation equals 2 establishments.
Because the data contains only count by zipcode, establishment size, industry and year,
I am agnostic as to whether these establishments have relocated, newly opened, recently
closed, grown or shrunk. Data is also collected for two placebo industries that should be
less impacted by ridesharing. First, dentists, which represent a service we travel to. Second,
10I use data on full-service restaurants (NAICS code 722511) with between 10 and 100 employees. This
ensures that I track destination-worthy restaurants, and not fast-casual establishments catering to work
lunches, or coffee shops co-located with residences.
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dry cleaners, a service we consume close to home, which may move with gentrification. In
both placebo industries, we have a low taste for variety, and so changes in travel options
are less likely to induce us to explore new dry cleaners or restaurants.
Panel (b) in Figure 1.2 provides a quick check that net creation increases in inaccessible
areas, and plots the growth in restaurants establishments in NYC by borough, using data
from the County Business Patterns (6-digit NAICS 722511). Between UberX’s entry in
2012 and the end of 2016, the outer boroughs increased their stock of restaurants by 70%,
while Manhattan only increased its stock by 20%.
As the outer boroughs become more accessible and gain new restaurants, they become more
desirable. To track how house prices and rents respond to ridesharing, I collect data on
both. House price data comes from the CoreLogic Deeds Database, from 2000q1-2015q4.
I construct zipcode level house price indices, normalized to 1 in 2000q1. Because of the
potential for renovations associated with urbanization and gentrification over the sample
period, I construct a hedonic index rather than a repeat-sales index. This method directly
controls for a suite of housing characteristics. For each zipcode j, I construct the HPIjt
using the following specification:
ln(Pkt) = HPIjtqtrt+δAcreskt+γSqftkt+Builtkt+Bedkt+Bathkt+Garagekt+ηkt (1.1)
The hedonic specification regresses transaction k’s log price, ln(Pkt), in zipcode j in quarter
t, on quarter dummies, qtrt, the number of acres and square feet in the home, and dummies
for the year built, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and whether the house has
a garage. The estimates for HPIjt provide the local house price index in zipcode j at time
t. This yields a zipcode by quarter panel of house price indices.
Housing rent data comes from Zillow’s Zillow Rent Index (ZRI) data for all homes, in-
cluding single family, multifamily, condos and co-ops, at the zipcode level from 2010m1
through 2018m5. The ZRI provides an estimate of median market rent for each zipcode,
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smoothed and seasonally adjusted, denominated in dollars. Zillow does not reveal its pro-
prietary index construction method. Figure 1.2(c) shows that ZRI, normalized to 1 in
2010m10, in the outer boroughs have grown 10% more than rents in Manhattan from the
end of 2010 to 2018, during the expansion of ridesharing.
1.2.3. Moving from NYC to a National Set of Cities
Taken together, the NHTS and TLC data show that residents opt for ridesharing instead
of public transit for social and recreational trips, and especially so in the boroughs of New
York City least accessible via public transit. The CBP and ZRI data show that restaurants
and rents have grown as the outer boroughs opened up due to ridesharing. Moving from the
NYC case study to a national sample of 34 cities (those with at least 2 million residents in
2010) requires additional data on local accessibility. The inner/outer borough comparison
is unique to New York City; not all cities have such intuitive cross-sectional variation in
access. In Section 1.3, I develop a metric for a destination’s accessibility, constructed from
travel times and local population data.
Travel Times, my preferred proxy for the cost of travel, come from scraping the Google
Maps Distance Matrix API, which provides travel duration for a variety of travel modes,
given the latitude and longitude of the origin and destination. There are 7,276 zipcodes in
the set of 34 CBSAs. I construct a travel matrix allowing travel between any two zipcodes
within the same CBSA. This yields 2.4 million zipcode origin-destination pairs, or trips.
To cut down on data costs, I assume travel times to be symmetric; mij = mji, where mij
denotes travel time in minutes from origin i to destination j. Google provides average travel
times, independent of traffic conditions, for driving and public transit modes.11 Taking the
difference between these two times yields the travel time wedge for a given trip ij. Finally, I
also construct the geodesic distance between any two zipcodes for an infrastructure-invariant
travel cost.
11In ongoing work, I query Google Maps’s website directly, and specify the departure time for each query.
This allows me to pull real-time driving and public transit times, depending on time of day and day of
week. This data contain ≈ 20 million queries, as a single trip is scraped multiple times.
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Population data comes from the American Community Survey (2011–2016) and the 2010
Census. I collect data on zipcode level population for use in constructing the accessibility
metrics. I also collect data on median earnings and education. These data are used to
control for time-varying demographic characteristics as well to test for residential sorting
and gentrification around the introduction of ridesharing.
Additionally, the County Business Patterns, National Household Travel Survey, CoreLogic
Deeds constructed HPI, and Zillow Rent index are collected for all zipcodes in the set of 34
cities.
1.3. Reduced-Form Research Design
1.3.1. Guiding Empirics with Model Intuition
I define an empirically tractable inaccessibility measure to provide cross-sectional variation
across neighborhoods within cities. This measure is guided by theory laid out formally in
Section 1.5. Here, I provide intuition linking the theory to the reduced-form inaccessibility
measure, as well as two hypotheses testable in the data. The model yields expressions for
the number of nontradable amenities (hereafter called “firms”) in destination j, Nj , as well









Where ρNij is the probability of traveling between i and j, a measure of firms’ access to
residents; and ρRij is the probability of traveling between i and j, a measure of residents’
access to firms. Equations 1.2 and 1.3 highlight that in equilibrium, residents wish to be
close to amenities, and amenities wish to be close to residents.
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These formulae yield two hypotheses we can test in the data. First, holding resident popu-
lation and income (Ri× Ii) fixed, an increase in firms’ access to residents, ρNij , will increase
the number of firms in destination j. The second hypothesis uses the fact that we can take







where ρ̂Rij is the remaining components of ρRij that remain in the summation. Equation
1.4 shows that, all else equal, in an environment where number of residents is fixed, an
improvement in access to firms (ρ̂Rij) or a growth in the number of firms nearby (Nj), must
be counterbalanced by rising housing costs. In short, there’s no free lunch: one pays for
restaurant access with higher rents.
1.3.2. An Empirical Definition of Inaccessibility
While the model used in Section 1.5 measures accessibility using data on times, incomes,
housing costs, and population, as well as unobserved parameters and location characteris-
tics, for the reduced-form estimation, the paper relies on a simpler metric. We can construct
an empirically tractable market access metric in terms of observables: travel time, mij , the
number residents, Ri, and the number of firms, Nj .
To provide cross-sectional variation in access to residents, I develop an index,mNj , that ranks
zipcodes within each U.S. city by their population-weighted average travel time, in minutes.
I do this for each travel metric discussed in section 1.2.3: public transit time, driving time,
the wedge between times, and geodesic distance. Because the NHTS data suggests that
residents in city centers switch from taking public transit in favor of ridesharing for social
and recreational trips, for the main results, I let travel time equal public transit time. In
additional analysis, I discuss other travel time options.
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Figure 1.3 provides a visual example of how this index is constructed for various destination
zipcodes within a city. In the example, zipcode A is the largest and closest to zipcodes
B and C. Tij denotes travel time between i and j. Pi denotes population in the origin
zipcode. The populated-weighted average travel time to A is defined as T̂A = TBA ×
PB
PB+PC+PD + TCA ×
PC
PB+PC+PD + TDA ×
PD
PB+PC+PD = 6.52, and to zipcode D as T̂D =
TBD × PBPA+PB+PC + TCD ×
PC
PA+PB+PC + TAD ×
PA
PA+PB+PC = 10.39. Zipcode A is quicker to
reach than zipcode D for the average city resident.
Intuitively, the index measures a destination zipcode’s access to its potential customer base.
To construct the general index, I collapse the two-dimensional travel matrix discussed in
Section 1.2.3 (the square matrix of origin-destination pairs ij with times mij in minutes)
to a 1-dimensional index for the destination zipcodes, j. The collapse proceeds as follows.
The sample is limited to destination zipcodes within 5 miles of a city’s center, as defined
by a Google search for “[City X] latitude and longitude”. For each destination zipcode,
average travel times, mNj , are calculated from all possible origin zipcodes within 5 miles
of the destination zipcode (potentially 10 miles from the city center), called the set SN ,





Equation 1.6 shows the analogue from the residents’ perspective. It measures residents’
access to firms, mRi , by constructing the firm-weighted average public transit time within a





Once I have two continuous measures of firm and resident accessibility, mNj and mRi , I split
the sample of zipcodes within each city into firm and resident accessible and inaccessible
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locations, summarized in Equations 1.7 and 1.8. Firm-inaccessible zipcodes are those for
which mNj is longer than the median time it takes to get to a restaurant in 2010, m̄N .
For example, if residents can reach 50% of the restaurants in 20 minutes, a zipcode taking
the average resident 30 minutes to reach is restaurant-inaccessible. Resident-inaccessible
zipcodes are those for which mRi is longer than the time it takes to get home from a
restaurant for the median resident, m̄R. If half of residents can get home from restaurants
within 20 minutes, a zipcode whose average travel time home from a restaurant is 30 minutes
is resident-inaccessible.
InaccessNj ≡ 1{mNj > m̄N} (1.7)
InaccessRi ≡ 1{mRi > m̄R} (1.8)
Since these metrics depend on a city’s public transit infrastructure, where residents live,
and where firms exist in the pre-period, the cutoff for inaccessibility varies by city. Figure
1.4 shows how m̄N varies for two cities in particular, Philadelphia and Houston. It takes the
average Philadelphia resident m̄N ≈ 35 minutes to travel to half of the city’s restaurants,
while in Houston the average Houstonian travels closer to 37 minutes to cover half of
Houston’s restaurants. This yields 6 accessible and 16 inaccessible zipcodes for Philadelphia,
and 8 accessible and 10 inaccessible zipcodes for Houston within 5 miles of the cities’ centers,
anchored to the distribution of firms and residents prior to the introduction of ridesharing.
1.3.3. Defining the Post-Period using UberX Entry
After ridesharing, we expect inaccessible locations to gain relatively more from their im-
provement in access than areas previously easy to reach via public transit. As inaccessibility
varies by city, so does ridesharing’s entry, with each city having its own entry date, Entryc.
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Temporal variation uses the staggered entry of UberX into into different cities, Postt:
Postt = 1{t > Entryc} (1.9)
Table 1.3 provides a list of the sample cities and their UberX entry year. For each of the 34
U.S. cities with at least 2 million residents in 2010, I search for UberX’s entry date. Often
times, Uber had a blog post announcing “[City X], your Uber is arriving now,” though this
was less common for earlier entries. When Uber did not provide the entry date itself, local
news outlets provided the entry dates.
Temporal variation uses UberX as opposed to UberBlack, which entered first, as UberBlack
relied on existing black car services and cost much more than UberX, as in Hall, Palsson and
Price (2018). This meant it did not markedly expand ride-hailing quantities, and catered
to those willing to pay higher fares. In addition, the paper uses Uber’s entry dates instead
of Lyft, or another ridesharing platform, as Uber has about 70% of the ridesharing market
as of mid-2018 and was the first platform on the scene in most cities.12
Figure 1.5 shows both the temporal and geographic variation in entry. The map shows that
UberX entered a variety of cities each year after 2012, without much evidence of gravity
between cities. For example, entry did not jump from NYC to Philadelphia, entering in
Dallas and Minneapolis in the meantime. This implies it would be difficult for residents
and firms of a given city to predict entry based on their geographic peers.
1.3.4. Differences-in-Differences Design
In order to measure the costs and benefits associated with ridesharing’s entry, we can study
inaccessible and accessible locations within cities before and after UberX entry. Formally, I
track restaurant net creation, house prices and rents over time in a differences-in-differences
framework, as in Equation 1.10.
12https://www.recode.net/2018/12/12/18134882/lyft-uber-ride-car-market-share
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Yjt = βInaccessNj × Postt + yeart + zipj + CBSAj × Postt + εjt (1.10)
The main analysis uses Yjt as the net creation of establishments of a given industry in a
zipcode: ∆#(restaurantsjt). For example, if zipcode j had 10 restaurants in 2010, and
12 restaurants in 2011, ∆#(restaurantsj,2011) = 2. Additional analysis sets Yjt as the
house price index or Zillow Rent Index normalized to the rent in the entry year. j indexes
zipcodes, and t indexes years. The coefficient of interest, β, measures the differential impact
that UberX’s entry has on Yjt in the inaccessible areas relative to the accessible areas per
unit of time. In addition to zipcode and year fixed effects, the specification includes a
CBSA-by-post indicator to control for time-varying cohort effects.
In order to obtain an estimate for pre-period Yjt in inaccessible locations, I remove zipcode
fixed effects and instead add dummies for inaccessibility, InaccessNj , and treatment-by-city
dummies, InaccessNj ×Cityj to control for cohort-treatment fixed effects. The coefficient on
InaccessNj yields the pre-period average Yjt, useful to gauge the magnitude of the treatment
effect.
Yjt = InaccessNj + Postt + βInaccessNj × Postt + CBSAj
+ CBSAj × Postt + InaccessNj × CBSAj + εjt
(1.11)
Focusing on the main outcome of interest, restaurant net creation, validity of this research
design requires three assumptions: first, the parallel trends assumption; second, exogeneity
of UberX entry to within–city restaurant dispersion; and third, that these results are not
driven by gentrification, urbanization, or other residential sorting that pulls restaurants
to new locations instead of UberX entry pushing them farther out. Section 2.5 provides
evidence to support each assumption.
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1.4. Reduced-Form Results
1.4.1. Ridesharing’s Entry Induces Restaurant Dispersion
Prior to ridesharing’s entry, restaurant inaccessible zipcodes had on average 14 restaurants
as shown in Table 1.4. Table 1.6 shows the results of the differences-in-differences analysis.
Column (1) matches estimating Equation 1.10, and shows that after ridesharing’s entry,
inaccessible zipcodes create 0.74 net new restaurants more than their accessible peers in
the same city. Column (2) adds time-varying demographic controls to assuage concerns
of demographic drivers pulling restaurants towards inaccessible neighborhoods; the point
estimate is stable at 0.73. Finally, column (3) removes the zip code fixed effects, instead
controlling for city and city-by-inaccessibility, as in Equation 1.11. This enables one to back
out a point estimate for pre-period restaurant net creation in inaccessible zipcodes. The
results in column (3) are consistent with the other columns, with the impact of ridesharing’s
entry on inaccessible areas adding an additional 0.74 net new restaurants, relative to their
accessible peers, and inaccessible zipcodes adding on average 0.72 restaurants per year in
the pre-period. Column (3) shows that inaccessible locations are doubling their rate of
restaurant net creation from 5% (0.72/14) in the pre-period to 10% (1.46/14) in the post-
period.
1.4.1.1. Testing Parallel Trends
The parallel trends assumption requires that inaccessible and accessible locations would
have similar trends in restaurant net creation or house price growth in the absence of
ridesharing. Table 1.4 tests whether restaurant net creation, HPI and ZRI differ in accessible
and inaccessible locations in the pre-period. Restaurant net creation is more than twice as
high in accessible locations than inaccessible locations, and these locations have nearly twice
the stock of establishments. As long as this net creation difference is stable in the pre-period,
there is no violation in parallel trends, and β is unbiased and correctly identified.
The event study in Figure 1.6 provides a check for parallel trends. A violation of parallel
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trends would manifest as a nonzero slope different from zero in the years prior to UberX
entry, while an exogeneity violation would show an uptick in the point estimate in the year
or two prior to entry. The graphs plot the point estimates from Equation 1.12 for the three






j ×RelY eark + yeart + zipj + εjt (1.12)
The left-hand panel plots the event study for annual restaurant net creation,




. In order to construct a balanced panel with
three years of data on either side, I limit the sample to 19/34 cities with full post-period
data. The annual restaurant net creation graph shows no evidence of pre-trends, with
all of the pre-period point estimates statistically indistinguishable from 0. In the post-
period, two of the three years have point estimates bounded away from 0, and nearing
0.9. For the net creation rate graph, there is again no evidence of any pre-trend that would
violate the parallel trends assumption. All of the pre-period point estimates are statistically
indistinguishable from 0. By the end of the post-period, inaccessible zipcodes have added
approximately 20% more of their restaurant stock relative to accessible zipcodes in the same
city.
1.4.1.2. Testing Exogeneity of UberX Entry
Addressing the second assumption stated at the end of Section 1.3, we need to establish that
Uber did not strategically enter cities after observing an expansion in restaurant amenities.
Uber is not forthcoming in its reasons for entry, with little discussion on its city level blogs.
Lief Johnson, Uber’s Director of New Mobility, has said publicly that Uber considers first
population size.13 Other important variables include the availability and affordability of
current public transit options in the city as a whole. Hall, Palsson and Price (2018), in
13https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vv734x/what-it-takes-to-lure-uber-to-your-small-town
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testing whether Uber is a substitute or complement to public transit, show that the main
determining factor in UberX’s entry date is indeed a city’s population size. Specifically,
they find that when comparing any two cities in which UberX entered, the probability that
UberX entered the larger city first is 68%. No other explanatory variable has even half the
magnitude of impact as population. The authors conclude that UberX’s entry decision is
largely based on tackling large markets first, and is uncorrelated with variables relating to
transit ridership.
In contrast to Hall, Palsson, and Price, identification in this paper’s context requires that
UberX entry be exogenous not to city-level characteristics, but to how characteristics differ
within cities. Table 1.5 tests for whether UberX’s entry month occurs earlier based on a
variety of city-level characteristics in the year prior to entry. In the top univariate panel,
we find that an additional million residents in the CBSA predicts that UberX enters 3
months earlier. We also see that UberX enters richer and more educated cities earlier, as
well as those with many new restaurants. Looking within cities, in the bottom panel, we
see that almost none of the differential characteristics predict UberX entry. Indeed, the
point estimate on restaurant creation in inaccessible vs. accessible locations is identical and
insignificant.
The event studies in Figure 1.6, also support exogeneity of UberX entry. Neither graph
suggests restaurant dispersion in the pre-period, making it unlikely that Uber strategically
entered with perfect timing in 19 separate cities upon observing dispersion.
1.4.1.3. Testing Gentrification and General Urbanization
The kinked time path of the point estimates in the event studies support the assumption
that generalized urbanization or gentrification trends are not causing the dispersion in
restaurants; however, to gauge how UberX interacts with gentrification and urbanization
forces, we can analyze how industries less likely to be impacted by UberX respond to
its introduction.14 Table 1.9 tests two industries’ responses to UberX entry, using the
14Even if gentrification occurs linearly, UberX might be amplifying urbanization and gentrification
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appropriate industry-specific InaccessNj .
Column (1) presents the restaurant results from Table 1.6. Dry cleaners represent a common
neighborhood good, which we are unlikely to switch after the introduction of ridesharing;
there is not much to be gained in variety by traveling to a new location. They also represent
a good tied to gentrification, as dry cleaning services are normal and so should increase as a
location becomes gentrified, and higher income. In the pre-period, dry cleaning inaccessible
zipcodes had a 0% growth rate off of a stock 5 establishments. The point estimate in
column (2) implies that these inaccessible zipcodes gain an additional 3% of their stock in
the post-period. While restaurant-inaccessible locations gain an additional restaurant every
8 months, it will take an a dry cleaning inaccessible zip code 7 years for a new establishment
to open. So while UberX may be interacting with gentrification, opening up areas to new
neighborhood amenities, the rate is far below the impact on an industry directly effected
by falling travel costs.
Column (3) in Table 1.9 shows the results for dentists, a nontradable service we travel to,
but which we are unlikely to switch with the introduction of a new travel mode. This
inelasticity comes from the high cost of switching one’s dentist , which outweighs any
gains from exploring a variety of dental service providers. Dentists then represent general
nontradable services in a city, which should disperse with the city if the restaurant results are
driven by urbanization instead of redistribution of trips in space induced by ridesharing.
Column (3) finds no evidence of general nontradable services dispersion, with the point
estimate for dentists and insignificant 0.11.
Finally, Appendix Figure A.6.1 shows that resident demographic characteristics do not
appear to respond to UberX entry in the first three years; populations remain stable, and
new entrants seem neither higher income, nor differently educated.
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1.4.1.4. Restaurant Results Robust to Different Travel Modes
The NHTS data indicate that residents switch from public transit to ridesharing for social
and recreational trips, motivating construction of the InaccessNj metric using the matrix of
public transit travel times between all origins and destinations in the set of cities; however,
this is not the only travel metric useful to construct. I construct the InaccessNj variable
similarly, only changing the origin-destination input matrix for a variety of other travel
times: the wedge between transit and driving times, the geodesic distance, and the driv-
ing times. Each metric illuminates one more aspect of how residents change their travel
patterns in light of improvements in accessibility. Table 1.7 shows the correlations between
the binary treatment indicators, for example (Distance, Transit) shows the correlation be-
tween InaccessNj (transit) and InaccessNj (distance). None of the different metrics are
perfectly correlated with each other, so they highlight different margins along which access
has changed.
Table 1.8 shows the results of changing the inaccessibility metric in Equation 1.10. Column
(1) is identical to column (1) in Table 1.6, and shows that the least transit accessible zipcodes
add an additional 0.74 restaurants relative to transit accessible zipcodes. Column (2) uses
the wedge, or the difference between driving and transit times, and shows that the areas
with the highest discrepancy between the two add an additional 0.58 net new restaurants
in the post-period. While highly correlated with the transit treatment, a zipcode with a 25
minute mean transit time and a 10 minute mean driving time is indexed similarly to one
with a 40 minute mean transit time and a 25 minute mean driving time; both have a 15
minute wedge, but the first zipcode is more central to the city, pushing the point estimate
downwards relative to the transit time metric. The difference between the wedge and transit
results highlight that activity increases most in areas that see a large drop in travel time
(large wedge), and are also farther from the transit lines.
Column (3) in Table 1.8 shows the results when using the geodesic distance origin-destination
matrix to construct InaccessNj . This column is infrastructure invariant across cities, allow-
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ing us to check whether reducing travel costs leads to restaurant dispersion, abstracting
from road and transit networks. The point estimate falls to 0.51, but remains statisti-
cally significant, showing that places farther away from the city centers see an increase in
restaurant activity.
Finally, column (4) provides a convenient placebo test of the natural experiment; simply
put, a zipcode difficult to reach by car in the pre-period remains difficult to reach by
car. The point estimate is less than a third as large as the transit results, and cannot be
distinguished from zero, indicating UberX has had little to no impact in areas difficult to
drive to. Additionally, interacting transit and driving inaccessible locations, Table A.5.3
provides additional evidence that net creation is happening in strictly transit inaccessible
locations.
1.4.1.5. Additional Robustness Checks
The results so far have explored a variety of controls, inaccessibility measures (including a
placebo), and heterogeneous industries (including placebos) with the consistent finding that
restaurants are dispersing in the age of ridesharing. These results do not show evidence of
pre-trends or strategic UberX entry, remain across different access measures, do not hold
for industries unlikely to be impacted by ridesharing, and remain robust to controlling for
time-varying demographic controls. I perform a number of additional robustness checks.
Table A.5.4 creates a zipcode-employement size category - year panel, in order to have more
observations within a zipcode-year for estimating Equation 1.10 with linear zipcode time
trends.15 The results remain robust, with each zipcode-size category adding 0.25 restau-
rants per year, since there are three categories, this sums to the familiar 0.74 restaurants
per zipcode per year. Adding time trends lowers the point estimate to 0.21, as shown in
column (3) of Table A.5.4, for a total impact of 0.63, in the ballpark of the main results.
15The CBP zipcode level data is a panel of zipcodes, over NAICS codes, over employment size classes. The
main results for restaurants sum over all employment classes with between 10 and 100 employees
(restaurants with fewer employees comprise a small (< 3%) share of employment in the industry, and add a
lot of noise to the data as they open and close often.)
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The results are also robust to defining the city according to different radii, expanding
the set of zipcode origin-destination pairs; the point estimate in Table A.5.5 falls from
0.74∗∗∗ at a city with a 5-mile radius to 0.14 with a 10-mile radius, with the point estimates
statistically significant through a 9-mile radius.
Using a dose-response design, in which I interact mNj with Postt, the point estimates
in Table A.5.6 imply that a zipcode with an additional minute of average transit travel
time adds 0.02 more restaurants per year after UberX entry; for a zipcode that it takes,
on average, 30 minutes to get to, this translates into 1 additional new restaurant every
2 years. I can also implement a binned dose response design, in which zipcodes are
divided into quintiles based on the 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, and 100th percentiles of travel
times to restaurants. The results, in Table A.5.7, show that relative to the most accessible
quintile, most of the restaurant creation happens in the 3rd and 4th quintiles, which go from
adding 0.7∗∗∗ − 1 new establishments in the pre-period, to adding 1.3∗∗∗ − 1.5∗∗∗ in the
post-period. In addition, the second quintile sees no impact due to ridesharing, so it does
not seem that establishments relocate from the accessible zipcodes to inaccessible, rather
this is true establishment creation.
Finally, the results are robust to controlling for whether a city is one of the top 5 most public
transit reliant cities, at least for commutes, as defined by the 2010 ACS commuting mode
data from Table A.5.2. Controlling for whether at least 10% of a city commutes via public
transit in Table A.5.8 drops the point estimate from 0.74∗∗∗ to 0.64∗∗∗, with the top 5 most
transit reliant showing an additional impact of 0.33.
The Other App Adoption Appendix discusses how ridesharing interacts with other
platforms that might be contributing to the main findings. For example, Yelp and UberX
amplify each other by providing information and access; however, the existence of these
other online platforms cannot explain the kinked nature of the event studies, and their
entry does not correspond with UberX’s.
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Finally, in the Travel Appendix, I check to make sure that travel patterns have dispersed
into InaccessNj areas along with restaurant activity. I explore travel trends in New York
City as well as national automotive vehicle emissions, both of which support the hypothesis
that residents travel more via car than in the pre-period. The NYC results suggest this is
due to taking trips to more transit inaccessible locations; even if residents take the same
number of trips, this implies changing from transit to ridesharing. The emissions results
find that inaccessible areas within cities see an increase in emissions of nearly 10%, averaged
over nearly five years.
1.4.2. Implications for Residential Housing Costs
The direct effect of UberX entry is to make inaccessible locations easier to reach. Indirectly,
as restaurants move into previously inaccessible locations, these zipcodes endogenously im-
prove, and the increased desirability will be reflected in house prices, as hypothesized in
section 1.3. Figures 1.7b and 1.7a show that rents for the average zipcode have increased by
≈ 3% after 4 years, and the median house price has increased by nearly 10% after 2 years.
16, 17
Three components drive the observed changes in house prices. First, these locations have
become closer to the city with the introduction of ridesharing. Second, they benefit from
amenities such as restaurants moving in. Third, homebuyers may expect these locations to
improve further. Differentiating between a location’s status as being restaurant-inaccessible,
InaccessNj , and resident-inaccessible, InaccessRj , can help disentangle the impacts of im-
provements in access from improvements in amenities.
Both improvements in amenities and access contribute to higher house prices. Table 1.10
shows the impact of UberX entry on median house price indices in resident-, InaccessRj ,
and restaurant-inaccessible, InaccessNj , zipcodes.18 The table shows meaningful HPI im-
16Figure A.6.9 shows some neighborhoods become superstars, with the mean house price growth topping
20% after 2 years.
17Due to data availability, one cannot track house prices as long as rents.
18House price results show median instead of mean impact due to large outliers in the right tail driving up
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pacts from both the increase in amenities, column (1), as well as the increase in access,
column (2). Column (1) shows that house prices for the median restaurant-inaccessible
zipcode rose by 3% in the post-period. Column (2) shows that house prices for the median
resident-inaccessible zipcode rose 3% in the post-period. Column (3) interacts both types
of inaccessibility; restaurant-inaccessible only zipcodes see a 4% increase in HPI, resident-
inaccessible only zipcodes realizes an increase of 2%, and should a zipcode be both resident-
and restaurant-inaccessible, the gains to UberX entry total 3%. Taken together, the magni-
tudes of the impacts for endogenous amenity improvements and improvements in access are
similar, but for the median zipcode, house prices increase nearly twice as fast with better
amenities than with better access.
Table 1.11 presents the same analysis, but for the mean Zillow Rent Index (ZRI). The third
row of column (1) shows that the average restaurant-inaccessible zipcode sees rents grow
1% per month more in the post-period, relative to accessible peers. The fifth row of column
(2) shows that the average resident-inaccessible zipcode sees 0.4% rent growth, though this
is indistinguishable from 0. Column (3) runs the horse race to distinguish the impact of
access from the impact due amenities. The third row of column (3) states that restaurant-
inaccessible zipcodes see an additional 1.6% rent growth, relative to accessible zipcodes.
The fifth row states that resident-inaccessible zipcodes see an additional 1.8% rent growth.
Column (3) shows that zipcodes which are both resident- and restaurant-inaccessible benefit
less from UberX entry, with the rent increase totaling 1%. Rents grow in zipcodes of both
inaccessibility types in the post-period, and in contrast to the house price results, grow at
similar rates.
Taken together, the restaurant and house price results show that ridesharing has had a
meaningful impact already in reshaping our cities. Private amenities have begun to disperse
in measurable ways, and house prices and rents have responded to the changing spatial
distribution of access and consumption.
average house price growth.
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1.5. Resident Welfare in the Age of Ridesharing
The reduced-form estimates measure the impacts on of ridesharing on the spatial distribu-
tion of restaurants, travel and house prices. By framing these costs and benefits in a spatial
model of consumer demand, one can weigh the dollar costs of increased house prices against
the benefits of fewer minutes of travel and more restaurant amenities. All derivations are
in the consumer theory appendix.
The model follows the demand structure developed by Ahlfeldt et al. in their 2015 paper,
in which they develop an empirically tractable spatial equilibrium framework.19 Zipcodes
in cities contain economic activity, including firm and resident locations, and are linked
by roadways and other transit infrastructure. In contrast to many of the papers in the
spatial equilibrium literature, the model abstracts away from any labor supply response,
motivated by the NHTS data suggesting residents do not commute to work via ridesharing.
This removes the joint location problem or where to live and work, fixing both locations
exogenous to the model. An additional adaptation fixes housing supply, since housing
markets are highly inelastic in the short term. This fixes the number of residents in a given
location. Residents choose how much housing, tradable goods, and nontradable amenities to
consume, as well as where to consume nontradable amenities, conditional on their residential
location. Aggregating up consumers’ demand for nontradables across all potential origins
yields a local demand function for nontradable amenities in each destination. Nontradable
amenity producers then clear the markets by matching demand.
Resident utility is a function of data and parameters. By estimating the local demand
function, we recover parameters necessary to estimate welfare. In combination with data
on income, travel times, and housing, one can construct a welfare money metric for a given
origin-destination pair. Finally, I calculate residents’ willingness to pay for UberX entry,
and observe whether homeowners or renters benefit more from entry.
19By nesting this demand structure in the full equilibrium model, we can later perform counterfactual
experiments.
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1.5.1. Residents’ Demand for Nontradables
The goal of the resident’s problem is to determine local demand in each location within a
city for three goods: a nontradable amenity we must travel to, ni, a tradable good, ci, and
housing, hi. Destinations are indexed by j, and residences are indexed by i.
A resident maximizes her utility over consuming housing, tradable goods and nontradable












s.t. Ii = qihi + pci + ni (1.14)
Utility is Cobb-Douglas, with an idiosyncratic preference term, zij , Frechet distributed,
F (zij) = e−TiEjz
−ε
ij , which governs where the nontradable amenity is eventually consumed.
Ej is the average amenity value of destination j, similar to a destination fixed-effect; Ti is
Ej ’s origin counterpart. ε governs substitutability between locations for the nontradable
amenity. Residents trade off travel against uniqueness when choosing where to consume.
For example, restaurants will have high ε, and so we will be willing to travel long distances
to a particularly attractive restaurant. Dry cleaners, on the other hand, are not very
differentiated, so the cost of travel is not justifiable and we will observe these to be clustered
by residences. mij is a distance term, in minutes, between locations i and j. τ is a scaling
parameter that raises or lowers mij , and can be thought of as the opportunity cost of travel
time. Ii is the endowed income for a resident in location i. qi is the local price of housing.20
20The model normalizes the price of nontradable services, the object of interest, rather than the price for the
outside good, housing, for three reasons. First, is data availability. Extensive margin changes for amenity
demand, establishment flow, and local housing rents are observable, while intensive margin changes for
amenity demand, prices, are unobservable. Second, rental payments are much larger as a proportion of
consumer budgets than amenity prices. Third, the price impacts from the introduction of ridesharing are
less clear than on housing or restaurant net creation. On the one hand, the introduction of ridesharing
brings establishments closer to each other, increasing competition, lowering local market share, and putting
downward pressure on prices until less productive establishments exit. On the other hand, ridesharing
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p is the price of tradable goods, which does not vary in space.
Maximizing utility leads to the following Marshallian demands:









Intuitively, consumers allocate a share of their income to nontradable services, and a share
to housing, which depends inversely on the price of housing. Plugging in these Marshallian
demands into the utility function, we can derive the indirect utility for the resident in
























Utility along route ij depends on the income and house prices in the origin location, the
price of tradables, the idiosyncratic shock, and the time it takes to travel between the origin
and destination.
brings establishments close to customers, increasing the demand for their services, pushing prices up and
encouraging entry. The net effect in the data shows that the increase in demand wins out; more
establishments have been added and rents have increased, but the implications for price are ambiguous. It
is not within the current scope of this framework to model local competition along with the increase in
access, so the model focuses on the extensive margin problem, with establishment entry being tied to local
rents and access.
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1.5.1.1. Deriving the Local Demand Estimating Equation
Given that zij is Frechet distributed, Vij is also Frechet distributed. Let the probability of





ρNij is the probability that a resident in location i travels to consume nontradables in des-
tination j; it is akin to a firm’s access to consumers. For nontradable amenity demand in
location j, Ndj , we sum over all possible origin location’s travel probabilities, ρNij , weighted











Intuitively, the term in the summation can be thought of as a market access term: how
many residents, Ri, are available to travel from all potential origin zipcdoes, i, to destination
zipcode j, weighted by the travel distance, eτmij , between i and j in city c. As distance
between i and j grows, (eτmij )−ε decreases; the farther apart are two locations, the less
likely income will flow from i to j.
Producers of nontradable amenities scale up production according to local demand, Ndj ,
so that the nontradables market clears: N sj = Ndj = Nj . As discussed in developing the
21In this setting, the number of residents, Ri, in an origin is taken as fixed and exogenous to the model;
however, in the standard spatial equilibrium framework, firms care about access to consumers, while




i (eτmij qβi )
−ε∑
r
TrIεr (eτmrj qβr )−ε
. This allows for endogenous resident location, Ri =
∑
j
ρRij ×Nj , depending on
Nj .
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empirical inaccessibility metrics, local demand depends on the probability of taking trip
ij, weighted by how many residents and how much income travels along that route. The
number of residents, Ri, is exogenous to the model as there is no new residential building,
and buildings cannot be converted between the commercial and residential sectors.
1.5.2. Constructing A Money Metric for Welfare
In order to compare residents’ welfare before and after UberX entry, one can take expec-





















To create a money metric, note that we can log-linearize the utility function along a route
ij,







ln(Ej)− βln(qi)− αln(p)− τ̂mij (1.22)
Equation 1.22 puts utility and its components in terms of elasticities; for example, a 1%
change in housing costs decreases utility along route ij by β%. Equation 1.23 holds utility
fixed, so that we can find the amount of income needed to balance the changes in qi, p, Ej ,
τ̂ , and mij , that is, to bring a resident to utility of 0:








To calculate the willingness-to-pay for UberX entry, we can compare the income needed to
reach 0 utility in the pre- and post-periods:
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WTPij = Iprei − I
post
i (1.24)
Intuitively, if a resident needs fewer dollars to reach a utility level of 0 in the post-period
than in the pre-period, he or she is willing to pay money for UberX entry. The difference
in compensation is the willingness-to-pay.
WTPij relies on a variety of estimated and calibrated inputs. In order to recover (time-
varying) destination quality, Ej , and the opportunity cost of travel time, τ , one estimates the
local demand function in Equation 1.20. Rents and travel times, qi and mij , are equilibrium
outcomes not solved for in the model. I estimate q̂j and m̂ij using the UberX natural
experiment in the reduced-form section in order to recover the exogenous component of
house price change and travel time change.22 I calibrate ε = 8, which is among the higher
range of elasticities of substitution for amenities, but in line with those estimated for the
restaurant industry (Couture, (2016); Atkin et al. (2018); Einav et al. (2019); Su (2018);
Couture et al. (2019)). Finally, β = 0.3, and α = 0.6 consistent with literature on the share
of housing and tradables expenditure shares in overall consumption. Finally, p is taken as
the city-specific non-housing CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
1.5.2.1. Recovering τ and Ej
Log-linearizing Equation 1.20 allows estimation via nonlinear least squares (NLS) to recover
the combined Frechet - travel cost parameter, ετ , as well as the non-observable zipcode level
characteristics, Ej :






+ ln(Ecj ) (1.25)
j indexes destination zipcodes within a city, c, with i indexing origin zipcodes. κc =
22When predicting q̂j and m̂ij , I use the continuous variable mNj instead of the discreet InaccessNj





is)−ε is a city-level fixed effect, as the term in the denominator of Equation
1.20 does not vary across zipcodes within a city.
Taking the model to the data, Nj is the annual zipcode level establishment count for restau-
rants, from the Census’ County Business Patterns. Ri is zipcode level population, from the
annual American Community Survey. mij comes from travel times scraped from Google
Maps, in combination with survey data from the NHTS, details of construction follow in
the NHTS Appendix. The parameters of interest are ετ , and Ej .
Estimation is performed using either pre-period or post-period data to estimate ε̂τpre and
ε̂τpost separately. Table 1.12 has the results of the estimation, showing that the cost of
travel has fallen by half from τ̂pre = 0.02 to τ̂pre = 0.01, reflecting the increased ease of
travel by private, flexible, and cheap ridesharing options. These results are in line with
previous estimates from Tsivanidis (2019), who finds τ = 0.012, and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
who find τ = 0.01.
1.5.2.2. Estimating qi for Renters and Homeowners
The reduced-form results show that house prices rise differentially in inaccessible areas in
the post-period. This will have different implications for renters and homeowners. Renters
will see the cost of living in a location rise, while homeowners will see their user costs fall
as their equity rises. This necessitates two different version of qi. Since qi is an equilibrium
outcome, we need to isolate the UberX specific component of changes in qi. For renters,
I regress rents in dollars, using the ZRI, on the continuous treatment variable, mNj , which
measures average travel time to location i, interacted with Postt:
ZRIit = λmNj × Postt + yeart + zipi + εit (1.26)
This yields the UberX implied portion of monthly rent increases. To get annual rent ex-
penditure, qZRIi , I multiply the predicted ˆ(ZRIit) by 12. For homeowners, I regress HPIi
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constructed using the CoreLogic data on the same treatment and post variables:
HPIit = λmNj × Postt + yeart + zipi + εit (1.27)
This yields the UberX implied portion of house price index increases. To get an annual
housing cost in dollar terms, I first multiply ˆHPIit by the value of a housing transaction in
2010, the first year in my sample. The provides the exogenous changes in house price, qHPi ,
as opposed to index, over the sample. Finally, the annual carrying cost of a home can be
measured in its user cost:
UCi = (1− τI)rqHPi + (1− τI)τpqHPi + (µ+ δ + γ)qHPi − πeqHPi (1.28)
Where τI is the resident’s income tax bracket, τp is local property taxes, µ is maintenance
cost, δ is depreciation costs, γ is the risk premium, and πe is expected nominal capital
gains.23 When a house appreciates in value, the mortgage and maintenance costs remain
fixed, but the tax burden and expected capital gains increase:
UCit = ((1− τI)r + µ+ δ + γ)qHPi0 + ((1− τI)τp − πe)qHPit (1.29)
Equation 1.29 shows how, as qHPit increases, as long as (1− τI)τp < πe, user costs will fall.24
This implies we can expect homeowners to see falling housing costs, compared to renters
who experience rising housing costs.
1.5.3. Calculating the Dollar Value of UberX Entry
With the estimated parameters, exogenous rents and house prices, and calibrated param-
eters in hand, we can calculate the compensation needed for residents to reach a utility
23This form of user cost assumes one can borrow and lend at the same rate.
24I calibrate user costs using the following parameters: τI = 0.36, r = 0.045, µ+ δ = 0.04, γ = 0.02,
τp = 0.01, and πe = 0.03
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of 0 before and after UberX entry. When UberX enters a city, it directly changes travel
times, mij , as residents switch from transit to driving, as well as travel costs, τ̂ . As res-
idents, restaurants, and housing markets respond, house prices and destination zipcodes’
values endogenously respond. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 show the willingness to pay for UberX
entry holding each of these components fixed to their pre-period levels. This allows one to
decompose the willingness-to-pay by travel times and costs, housing costs, and amenities.
The first row of Table 1.13 shows the annual pre-period dollar compensation needed to bring
a resident to 0 utility, by whether the resident lives in an inaccessible or accessible location.25
In the pre-period, accessible homeowners need $7,814 in compensation, while inaccessible
homeowners need $6,485. The second row documents how compensation changes when
travel costs, τ , fall, holding all else fixed. Now, accessible homeowners need $6,996 in
compensation, and inaccessible homeowners need $5,783. Had they been given their pre-
period compensations, they would have positive utilities of $818 and $702, respectively. By
bringing them back down to their original utilities of 0, this reflects a WTPi of $818 and
$702. The third row varies travel costs and times. This actually lowers willingness-to-pay, as
the distribution of travel times no longer matches the distributions of amenities or prices; in
effect, times have decreased to places with poor amenities and increased to places with many
amenities. Willingness-to-pay increases markedly in row 4, reflecting that homeowners have
seen large gains to their equity position in the ridesharing era as user costs fall. Finally, after
allowing amenities to resort, destination quality improves and homeowners’ willingness-
to-pay increases again, to $945–$1178 depending on accessibility status. This translates
to a monthly WTP for ridesharing of $79–$98. Inaccessible homeowners are willing to
pay 14.6% of their pre-period compensation for UberX entry. Accessible homeowners are
willing to pay 15.1% of their pre-period compensation for UberX entry, showing that while
homeowners in both locations are better off, accessible homeowners have benefited by 0.6%
more. While house prices grew faster in inaccessible locations, they are still higher in levels
25Since each origin is connected to 12 destination, the numbers in Tables 1.13 and 1.14 multiplies the
per-route WTPij by 12 to get the total WTPi conditional on living in i.
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in the accessible locations; slower growth off a higher base yields more capital gains in
dollars.
Table 1.14 shows the same welfare exercise for renters. In the pre-period, accessible renters
needed $6,565 in compensation, while inaccessible renters needed $5,899. After travel costs
fall, accessible and inaccessible renters are willing to pay about $665. This time, the fourth
row shows that allowing for housing costs to change decreases the willingness-to-pay sub-
stantially, falling from $666 and $665 for accessible and inaccessible renters to $275 and
$250. In contrast to homeowners, who experience lower user costs as house prices rise
through gains in equity, renters take only the price hit. Allowing amenities to adjust in the
post-period balances out some of the rent burden, as renters enjoy access to better desti-
nations, increasing willingness-to-pay with the full model to $467 and $394 for accessible
and inaccessible renters. This translates to a monthly WTP of $33–$39. In all, renters
in inaccessible locations are willing to pay 6.7% of their pre-period compensation, while
renters in accessible locations are willing to pay 7.1%, showing that renters in accessible
locations realize higher welfare gains than their inaccessible peers. This is because they
enjoy increases in access and amenities, without as much increase in rents.
While all residents gain from UberX entry, the homeowners are the welfare winners in this
exercise. The average homeowner is willing to pay $1,060 for UberX entry, while the average
renter is willing to pay $430, only 40% as much. As rents and house prices continue to rise,
the wedge between renter and homeowner WTP may continue to grow, eventually leading to
renter displacement if housing supply does not adjust to put downward pressure on prices.
1.6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to our understanding of accessibility and consumption and provides
evidence that the spatial distribution of consumption has responded to ridesharing’s entry.
By exploiting the staggered entry of UberX crossed with the pre-existing distribution of
access within cities, the paper explains how ridesharing has begun reshaping our cities. I
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find that ridesharing has already meaningfully impacted restaurant dispersion, house prices,
and resident welfare by expanding the set of desirable and accessible zipcodes in cities.
Restaurant net creation in inaccessible locations doubles in the post-period, as local demand
changes in space. As these inaccessible areas become more desirable, house prices rise by
4%, reflecting their improved access and amenities.
Embedding these reduced-form findings in a spatial demand structure provides a means to
weigh the benefits of improved access and amenities against the cost of rising house prices.
I find that homeowners are willing to pay nearly 2.5 times as much for UberX entry than
renters, as they can capture equity gains from increases in house prices, while renters only
see higher costs. Residents in both inaccessible and accessible locations see welfare gains,
but both renters and homeowners see marginally higher welfare gains in accessible areas.
These findings contribute to our understanding of neighborhood dynamics and gentrifica-
tion in a variety of ways. First, we can observe in real time which economic agents respond
to changes in neighborhood accessibility. In contrast to much of the research on how trans-
portation reshapes cities, which primarily compares two equilibria, one prior to the change
in infrastructure and one often decades later, the quick entry of ridesharing independent
of urban planning allows researchers to study the impacts in real time. There is no need
to wait for full roll-out or adjustment. This paper suggests that amenities most sensitive
to changes in travel respond first, followed by house prices. Time will tell whether other
industries follow as these areas continue to improve, or whether residents begin to resort,
changing local labor supply.
The paper also signals that further work is needed to understand whether ridesharing’s
introduction will induce more gentrification or revitalization in previously inaccessible lo-
cations. While rents and house prices have risen in the post-period, these annual increases
are well within the bounds allowed by rent-stabilization policies. Furthermore, the lack
of evidence of neighborhood sorting thus far suggests that housing costs have not become
burdensome enough for residents to be displaced. In the medium to long term, whether
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inaccessible neighborhoods revitalize or gentrify will depend on their local housing and
commercial real estate supply elasticities, as well as the ease of conversion between the
two sectors, suggesting that local zoning restrictions will play a large role in the eventual
character of the inaccessible zipcodes.
1.7. Tables
Table 1.1: NHTS Trip Shares by Mode
All Origins Central Origins
2009 2017 2009 2017
All Trips
% driving 95 94 82 71
% transit 5 5 17 25
% taxi/ridesharing 0 1 2 4
Work Trips
% driving 90 89 73 59
% transit 10 10 25 39
% taxi/ridesharing 0 1 1 2
Social & Recreational Trips
% driving 94 93 81 70
% transit 5 5 18 20
% taxi/ridesharing 1 2 2 10
Notes: This table shows the trip shares by purpose over modes in the 2009 and 2017 NHTS
confidential trip files. Sample covers 31 U.S. CBSAs with at least 2 million residents in 2010.
All trips originate at home, to maintain cross-wave comparability of 2009 and 2017 data.
Central Origins are defined as those trips from home with a home census tract identified as
laying within a 5 mile radius of the city center.
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Table 1.2: NHTS Trip Shares by Purpose
All Origins Central Origins
2009 2017 2009 2017
All Trips
% Work 19 23 20 32
% Social 17 17 19 17
Driving Trips
% Work 18 21 20 26
% Social 17 17 18 18
Transit Trips
% Work 33 46 36 50
% Social 16 13 24 14
Taxi/Ridesharing Trips
% Work 11 19 16 24
% Social 23 34 13 46
Notes: This table shows the trip shares by type of travel mode over trip purpose in the
2009 and 2017 NHTS confidential trip files. Trip purposes not included in table are “other”
and “shopping”. Sample covers 31 U.S. CBSAs with at least 2 million residents in 2010.
All trips originate at home, to maintain cross-wave comparability of 2009 and 2017 data.
Central Origins are defined as those trips from home with a home census tract identified as
laying within a 5 mile radius of the city center.
Table 1.3: UberX Entry Year
Entry Year Cities City Names
2012 2 New York, San Francisco
2013 16
Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte,
Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los
Angeles, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Sacramento,
San Diego, Santa Barbara, Tucson,
Washington DC
2014 14
Cincinnati, Colorado Springs, Houston,
Kansas City, Miami, Orlando, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Portland, Raleigh, Riverside,
San Antonio, Tampa
2015 2 Las Vegas, St. Louis
Notes: This table lists cities’ UberX entry years. When possible, entry year is determined
by Uber’s city-specific blog post announcing expansion of services to the city. If not avail-
able, local news sources provide UberX launch dates.
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Table 1.4: Balance Table for Outcome Variables
InaccessNj = 0 InaccessNj = 1 Difference
Yjt
∆(# Restaurants) 1.43 0.67 0.76∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.07) (0.15)
HPI 1.74 1.72 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
ZRI 0.95 0.96 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Related Descriptives
#Restaurants 26 14 12∗∗∗
(1.01) (0.52) (1.02)
House Price ($1000’s) 645 432 213∗∗∗
(53) (47) (78)
Rents ($) 1,620 1,525 95∗∗∗
(8.35) (8.03) (13)
Table 1.5: UberX Entry Uncorrelated with Within City Characteristics
population earnings fraction bachelor’s degree restaurant net creation
City Wide
β -3.23** -0.47** -0.44** -0.11***
Within City
βaccess -5.6 -0.25 -0.02 -0.17
βinaccess -16.6 -0.06 -0.44** -0.17
Obs. 34 34 34 34
Note: This tables regresses UberX entry month, on city level characteristics for the 34
cities in the sample in the top panel, Monthc = βXc + εc. The bottom panel regresses
entry month on within-city characteristics for the same cities,Monthc = βAccessXAccessc +
βInaccessXInaccessc + εc.
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Table 1.6: Restaurant Net Creation Results
(1) (2) (3)
Postt × InaccessNj 0.744∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.247) (0.212)




R-Squared 0.253 0.270 0.168
Observations 3336 3026 3341
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X
Incjt, Edujt, Popjt X
CBSA FE X
CBSA X Inaccess. X
CBSA X Post X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yjt = βInaccessNj ×Postt+yeart+zipj+εjt, in
column (1). Column (2) contains time-varying demographic controls. Column (3) removes
zipcode fixed effects and introduces inaccessible-by-time, inaccessible-by-city and city-by-
post dummies. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.7: Correlation between Different Inaccessibility Metrics
Transit Distance Wedge Driving
Transit 1
Distance 0.34 1
Wedge 0.84 0.29 1
Driving 0.13 0.18 0.00 1
Notes: This table shows the correlation between different InaccessNj metrics, depending
on the input origin-destination travel times matrix, in which travel time is one of: transit
travel time, geodesic distance, wedge (transit - driving) in travel time, and driving travel
time.
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Table 1.8: Restaurant Net Creation by Inaccessibility Metric
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transit Wedge Distance Drive
Postt × InaccessNj 0.744∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.202
(0.223) (0.259) (0.155) (0.213)
Postt 0.00710 0.154 0.268 0.385
(0.316) (0.305) (0.307) (0.360)
R-Squared 0.253 0.252 0.252 0.251
Observations 3336 3336 3336 3341
Year FE X X X X
Zip FE X X X X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yjt = βInaccessNj ×Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt,
with different metrics for constructing InaccessNj . All columns contain the same spec-
ification as in column (1) of Table 1.6. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in
parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.9: Industry Net Creation Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3)
Restaurants Dry Cleaners Dentists
Postt × InaccessNj 0.744∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.109
(0.0189) (0.223) (0.119)
Postt 0.007 -0.107 0.0240
(0.316) (0.140) (0.213)
R-Squared 0.253 0.143 0.171
Observations 3336 2504 3108
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yjt = βInaccessNj ×Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt,
with different industries for Yjt. All columns contain the same specification as in column (1)
of Table 1.6, and use the public transit metric for inaccessibility. Standard errors clustered
by Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.10: UberX Impact on HPI
(1) (2) (3)
Median Median Median








InaccessRj × Postt 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗
(0.00670) (0.0106)
InaccessNj × InaccessRj × Postt -0.0291∗
(0.0151)
Observations 9926 9926 9926
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X X
Notes: This table shows the quantile regression estimates from HPIjt = β1InaccessNj ×
Postt + β2InaccessRj × Postt + β3InaccessNj × InaccessRj × Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt.
Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.11: UberX Impact on ZRI
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Mean Mean








InaccessRj × Postt 0.00379 0.0183∗∗
(0.00510) (0.00792)
InaccessNj × InaccessRj × Postt -0.0244∗∗∗
(0.00911)
R-Squared 0.774 0.774 0.775
Observations 39321 39321 39321
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from ZRIjt = β1InaccessNj × Postt +
β2Inaccess
R
j × Postt + β3InaccessNj × InaccessRj × Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt.
Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.12: Model Parameters
source







Notes: Calibrated parameters taken from literature, estimated parameters obtained







+ ln(Ecj ), using
nonlinear least squares for either pooled pre-period or pooled post-period data.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.









Cost: τ̂ 6,996 5,783 818 702
Times & cost: m̂ij , τ̂ 7,251 6,051 563 434
Times, cost, house prices: m̂ij , τ̂ , q̂i 6,848 5,696 966 789
Full Model: m̂ij , τ̂ , q̂i, Êj 6,639 5,540 1178 945
Notes: This table shows that mean compensation and compensation change for resi-
dent homeowners, by residential location restaurant-inaccessibility status.









Cost: τ̂ 5,899 5,590 666 665
Times & cost: m̂ij , τ̂ 6,031 5,750 534 505
Times, cost, house prices: m̂ij , τ̂ , q̂i 6,290 6,005 275 250
Full Model: m̂ij , τ̂ , q̂i, Êj 6,098 5,861 467 394
Notes: This table shows that mean compensation and compensation change for resi-
dent renters, by residential location restaurant-inaccessibility status.
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1.8. Figures


































Top 5 Public Transit CBSA All Other CBSAs
2009 2017
Notes: This table shows the share of social and recreational trips originating within 5 miles
of a city center by taxi in the 2009 and 2017 NHTS confidential trip files, for public transit
heavy cities (New York City, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, and Chicago) vs.
other cities. All trips originate at home, to maintain cross-wave comparability of 2009
and 2017 data. Central Origins are defined as those trips from home with a home census
tract identified as laying within a 5 mile radius of the city center.
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(c) Rent Growth by Borough
Figure 1.3: Destination Zipcode Travel Index
(a) Zipcode A (b) Zipcode D
Notes: Panel (a) calculates the weighted average travel time from zipcodes B, C, and
D traveling to zipcode A. Panel (b) calculates the weighted average travel time from
zipcodes A, B, and C to zipcode D. Because the zipcodes differ in their populations,
weighted average travel times differ between A and D.
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mean transit time (mj)
Notes: The left panel plots the distribution of restaurants (left vertical axis) by mNj
for Philadelphia. The vertical gray line is the public transit time to cover half of all
restaurants, m̄N . The right panel shows the same information for Houston.
Figure 1.5: Temporal Variation in UberX Entry
Entry as of 2012 Entry as of 2013
Entry as of 2014 Entry as of 2015
Notes: The four maps plot the cities in which UberX enters for each year between 2012
and 2015. Blue circles denote current year is the entry year, red x’s denote that UberX
had already entered the city in a previous year.
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Figure 1.6: Testing Parallel Trends: Annual Restaurant Net Creation and Net Creation
Rate
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j ×RelY eark + yeart + zipj + εjt. Yjt is
net restaurant creation in panel (a), and net creation rate in panel (b). Sample includes
19/34 cities to capture 3 years of post data in balanced panel. Standard errors clustered
by Cityc × Postct, 95% confidence intervals shown.
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Years Relative to UberX Entry
Notes: Panel (a )shows the βt estimated from ZRIjt = Y eart +
∑τ=5
τ=−4{βτInaccessj ×
Y earτ} + Cityj × Y eart + ζj + εjt. Panel (b) shows the βt estimated from a quantile
regression for HPIjt = Y eart +
∑τ=3
τ=−4{βτInaccessj ×Y earτ}+Cityc×Y eart + ζj + εjt.
ZRI uses monthly data, while HPI uses quarterly.
Robust standard errors shown for HPI. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct for
ZRI. 95% confidence intervals shown.
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CHAPTER 2 : Global Capital and Local Assets: House Prices, Quantities, and
Elasticities
2.1. Introduction
The emergence of a new international supply of savings, the so-called “global savings glut,”
has been suggested as a possible source of asset market instability and contributor to the
Global Financial Crisis (e.g. Bernanke (2005)). Investors in search of yield, vacation homes,
or protection from corruption crack-downs, frequently invest in housing abroad (Favilukis
and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2017; Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2018). In the United States,
this phenomenon has been especially dramatic: Foreign purchases of residential real estate
has increased from $66 billion in 2010 to $153 billion in 2017 (NAR, 2017). These foreign
residential investments are often contentious because they are perceived to drive up housing
costs for local residents, exacerbating existing concerns with affordability. In response, many
countries have enacted foreign buyer taxes, which require foreigners wishing to purchase real
estate pay an additional tax, in order to deter foreign capital inflows and stabilize housing
prices.
In this paper, we use geographic and temporal variation in exposure to international capital
flows to study their impact on local asset markets. First, we examine the effects of these
extreme capital flows and international foreign buyer taxes on housing prices and quantities
in an untaxed substitute market, the U.S. housing market. Second, we estimate elasticities
of house prices and quantities with respect to foreign capital. Third, we use this natural
experiment to isolate a housing demand shock, and estimate new local house price elasticities
of supply for the 100 largest U.S. cities.
In order to measure the direct impact of increased foreign capital on domestic housing
markets, we exploit both time-series variation in international tax policy and cross-sectional
variation in the likely destinations for these investments. Foreign buyer taxes were first
imposed in Singapore in December 2011, and have followed a predictable path thereafter
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based on the proximity to China and the associated influx of Chinese foreign capital through
Hong Kong, Australia, and Canada. Thus, we define our policy intervention date based on
Singapore’s adoption of their foreign buyer tax.
Our cross-sectional variation in the predicted destinations for foreign investments builds on
the immigration literature that finds differential likelihoods of immigrant arrival based on
the pre-existing mix of foreign-born residents in a local market (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card
and DiNardo, 2000; Card, 2001). We compare house price growth in zipcodes with larger
shares of foreign-born residents to those less likely to attract foreign capital. To establish
the credibility of the demand shock, we focus on foreign–born Chinese purchasers. While
applicable to all foreign purchasers, the substantial capital outflows from China over this
period and large Chinese resident population in the U.S. enable a difference-in-differences
analysis to document meaningful domestic price effects of foreign macroprudential policy.1
Estimates from our difference-in-differences design suggest that house prices rose differen-
tially in high foreign-born Chinese neighborhoods relative to the rest of the U.S. by 8%
percent from 2012 to 2018. In contrast, quantities (as measured by permitting activity)
rose differentially by 0.5%. We explore a range of alternative counterfactual house price
paths to address concerns related to the parallel trends assumption inherent in this com-
parison: house prices are assumed to have evolved similarly across zipcodes before and
after 2012. Beyond comparing pre-trends in an event study design, we also generate control
groups through propensity score matching and synthetic control exercises. Our preferred
specification includes MSA-by-quarter fixed effects, thus controlling for heterogeneity in
the housing market recovery across cities, and instead focusing exclusively on within-city
variation across zipcodes based on their degree of pre-shock immigrant concentration.
In order to measure the elasticity of house prices and quantities to foreign capital more
generally, we move away from focusing only on foreign-born Chinese neighborhoods and
1Using other immigrant groups with less capital variation in such a blunt research design is noisy. In our
later analysis we unpack this reduced form method, study continuous capital flows directly, and
incorporate all foreign purchaser groups.
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develop a continuous measure of expected foreign capital inflows for each zipcode. To do
so, we “distribute” foreign capital throughout the U.S. to zipcodes based on their pre–
period foreign–born composition (in the style of a Bartik instrument), and instrument for
local expected capital flows with the difference-in-differences in the first stage. The benefit
of using this method is twofold: it removes the simultaneity bias coming from domestic
housing supply responses, as well as uses only relevant housing demand–side variation since
individual purchasers experience the tax shock, while foreign firm and government capital
is not affected.
This two-step research design yields an estimated elasticity of house prices to capital flows
of 0.87. The mean zipcode experienced an increase in expected capital of 63%, implying a
55% house price growth; this average masks the large heterogeneity in zipcode responses,
driven by a long right tail in expected local capital flows. The elasticity implies that the
median expected capital flow zipcode experienced a 33% increase in house prices between
2009 and 2018, while the 99th percentile of expected capital flows saw house prices triple.
For quantities, we estimate an elasticity of 0.004. The average zipcode experienced an
increase in expected capital of 63% between 2011q3, the final quarter before the foreign tax
policy changes began, and 2018q1, our most recent year of data. This implies an increase
in permitting share of 0.25%.
By combining the estimated house price and quantity elasticities with respect to expected
capital flows, we can construct a new local house price elasticity of supply for a given city.
We estimate short–run supply elasticities for the 100 largest U.S. cities (as measured by
population in 2010). The average city’s housing market is highly inelastic in the short run,
with an elasticity of 0.10. Our new measure produces a ranking consistent with others in
the literature, with Providence, San Francisco, and Boston as the least elastic metros, and
places like College Station, TX, Laredo, TX, and Salisbury, MD as the most elastic over
this ten-year period. These estimates provide new local measures of how responsive housing
construction is to demand shocks over the most recent time horizon.
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Our work contributes to a growing literature on cross-country capital flows and their impact
on asset markets such as housing. In closely related concurrent work, Li, Shen, and Zhang
(2019) find that the China shock in in three California cities between 2007 and 2013 signif-
icantly raised house prices in areas exposed to more Chinese immigrants, with the largest
impacts after 2012, in line with our post–period results. Badarinza and Ramadorai (2018),
examines inflows to the London housing market from countries experiencing political risk,
Sá (2016) explores properties in the U.K. owned by foreign companies, while Cvijanovic
and Spaenjers (2018) studies the effect of international buyers on the Paris housing market.
A now extensive literature has also emphasized the role of investors and out-of-town buy-
ers during the U.S. housing boom (Bayer et al., 2011; Chinco and Mayer, 2015; Favilukis
and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2017; DeFusco et al., 2018). We extend this literature by explor-
ing a time period when international housing purchases in the U.S. skyrocketed, and were
uniquely driven by the growth in purchases from one country (China). We further provide
new estimates of the elasticity of house prices and housing supply with respect to capital
flows.
These results also inform the literature on the impact of immigration on housing markets.
We similarly exploit cross-sectional variation in pre-existing population shares, as in Card
(2001), expanding the applicability of this strategy beyond the flow of migrants to predicted
exposure to capital flow shocks. Many papers have examined the impact of immigrants on
house prices directly, such as Sá (2014), Saiz (2003, 2007), Saiz and Wachter (2011), Akbari
and Aydede (2012), Pavlov and Somerville (2016). In our setting, as in some mentioned
above, these housing purchases are likely to be used as secondary residences, rather than as
primary residences or investment properties; In Appendix A.8.2, we show that while rents
have risen slower than house prices, there is still evidence of rental displacement as rents
rise by 5% more on average in highly exposed areas.2
Our work documents an important consequence of international macroprudential policies:
2A related strand of literature has explored the role of institutional, but not necessarily international,
investors in the U.S. housing market. See, e.g. Lambie-Hanson et al. (2019).
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Foreign buyer taxes in other countries affect the flow of capital into the United States.
Claessens (2014) provides an overview of macroprudential policy tools and their relationship
with housing markets. As discussed in detail by Gergen (2017), taxes of this nature are
especially likely to lead to avoidance or evasion. We innovate by using these non-U.S.
macroprudential policies as a shock to U.S. housing markets, thereby incorporating the
effects of policy to influence the destination for international capital flows.
Finally, our work contributes to a small but growing literature estimating local house price
elasticities. Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) show that the U.S. housing market has
a large spatial distribution of regulatory policies, and construct a local measure of regula-
tory stringency. Saiz (2010) uses this local measure in combination with geographic and
topographic characteristics to provide long–run estimates of supply elasticities, and Cos-
man, Davidoff, and Williams (2018) update this model by incorporating dynamic changes
to available land. More recent work by Gyourko and Krimmel (2019) show that local hous-
ing markets have become increasingly regulated. Consistent with this finding, Aasveit et
al (2020) show that housing markets have become more inelastic, instrumenting for house
prices with crime rates and disposable income changes. Finally, Baum–Snow and Han (2019)
use labor demand shocks in conjunction with theory to construct local house price elastic-
ities. In contrast to the related literature, we exploit a housing demand shock originating
from foreign countries rather than local labor markets to estimate the short-run elasticity
of supply.
In the next section, we provide background on the tax policies and Chinese capital flight.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 discuss our data and differences-in-differences research design. Sec-
tion 2.5 presents the results of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy. We discuss
our instrumental variables design and their respective results in Section 2.6. House price
elasticity results are presented in section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2. Background
Our identification strategy relies on a change in the probability of international investment
in the U.S. housing market after foreign purchaser tax policies are implemented elsewhere.
While applicable to all international buyers, many of these policies targeted Chinese buyers
during a period when capital flight from China sharply increased. In this section, we
document the growth in Chinese capital investment in the U.S. housing market and describe
the foreign buyer tax policies that steered capital toward the untaxed U.S. market starting
in 2011.
2.2.1. Chinese Policies Impacting Capital Flight
As shown in Figure 2.1(a), beginning in 2012 and accelerating in 2014, massive amounts of
capital fled China.3 While China is known for its tight capital controls, limiting renminbi
to USD conversions to $50,000 per person per year in 2015, huge volumes of capital leave
the country each year through pooled individual conversions and underground banking net-
works.4 Relaxation of policies related to capital outflows, in conjunction with anticipatory
behavior around an expanded anti-corruption campaign, led to sharp increases in capital
flight beginning in 2013 and continuing for the next four years.5
In September 2013, the Chinese State Council approved the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, with
the intention to increase investment in China and abroad.6 Combined with free trading of
renminbi in offshore financial markets like Hong Kong, capital began to flow out of China
in earnest in 2014. In addition, the Chinese savings glut had trouble finding returns in
3Our measure of capital outflows comes from China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange’s (SAFE)
time series of balance of payments. Capital outflows are defined as the quarterly sum of: 2.2.1.2. Portfolio
Investment, 2.2.1.4. Other Investment, and 3. Net errors and omissions, in accordance with the definition
used by Fitch Ratings.
4Hu, Fox, Alfred Liu, Paul Panckhurst and Sheridan Prasso. “China’s Money Exodus: Here’s how the
Chinese send billions abroad to buy homes,” Bloomberg News, Nov. 2, 2015.
5Sender, Henry. “China’s anti-corruption push may drive wealthy overseas.” The Financial Times, Nov. 11,
2014.
6Orlik, Tom. “China Signals Speedier Moves to Loosen Capital Controls; Bank Official Says Recent
Volatility Shouldn’t Hinder Reform,” The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5th, 2013
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domestic asset markets outside of housing, which became increasingly expensive.7
The drive to crackdown on corruption seemed, if anything, to initially spur even more
capital flight. In contrast to financial institutions, real estate agents are generally not
required to report suspicious activity associated with money laundering, such as large cash
transactions or purchases involving LLCs (Hundtofte and Rantala 2018). In November 2014,
private bankers in Hong Kong stated that demand for foreign real estate had grown since the
anti-corruption campaign began.8 Not surprisingly, from 2013–2014, 76% of Chinese home
purchases in the U.S. were all-cash, with an average transaction price of over $590,000. For
comparison, during the same time period, 33% of domestic purchases were all cash, with a
mean transaction price of $247,000.9
Two notable events have potential to limit capital flight from China over our data period.
First, at the end of 2016, the Chinese government limited the amount of capital leaving the
country by requiring financial institutions to report overseas transfers above $10,000, and
disallowing the $50,000 individual quota to be used to purchase overseas property. Second,
the rise of the U.S.–China trade war has the potential to disrupt investment in a variety
of U.S.-based assets. In this paper, we focus our analysis on the period 2010–2018, and
check in event study analysis whether there has been a measurable tightening of Chinese
investment in U.S. real estate. In sum, the search for return and the risk of expropriation
sent Chinese capital abroad, first to its neighbors, and then farther afield.
2.2.2. Foreign Buyer Tax Policies
Observing foreign investment bidding up domestic house prices, many countries have im-
posed taxes on the purchase of housing by foreign buyers. For instance, Singapore, Hong
7Bradsher, Keith and Dionne Searcey. “Chinese Cash Floods U.S. Real Estate Market.” The New York
Times, Nov. 28, 2015.
8Henry Sender, “China’s anti-corruption push may drive wealthy overseas,” Financial Times, November
11th, 2014.
9Yun, Lawrence, Jed Smith and Gay Cororaton, “2014 Profile of International Home Buying Activity:
Purchases of U.S. Real Estate by International Clients for the Twelve Month Period Ending March 2014.”
National Association of Realtors, June 2014.
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Kong, Australia, and Canada have all introduced taxes in recent years.10 These policies add
a stamp tax or additional duty to purchases by foreign buyers, ranging from 3% (Victoria,
Australia’s first tax) to 20% (Singapore’s third tax). Some of these foreign buyer taxes have
been coupled with “empty home” taxes as in British Columbia and New South Wales, or
limits on foreign ownership of new apartment and hotel construction projects, as in New
South Wales and New Zealand.
The reported political motivations for these taxes have focused on the macroprudential
stability of housing markets and affordability for domestic residents. However, the imple-
mentation of these taxes have predictably responded to an influx of Chinese foreign capital
sharply driving up the cost of housing. Figure 2.2 shows the time series of price indices of se-
lect international housing markets, with vertical lines denoting periods between Singapore’s
first tax in December 2011, and the relevant location’s foreign buyer tax adoptions. Most ge-
ographically proximate to China, Singapore and Hong Kong experienced rising prices from
2010 to 2012, as shown in panels (a) and (b). Chinese investment moved east to Australia,
shown in panels (b) and (c), then further east to Canada, shown in panels (d) and (e).
Figure 2.3 summarizes the timing and location of the enactment of these taxes, displaying
how they originated in countries closest to China beginning in 2011 and expanded outward
thereafter.
Figure 2.1(b) presents time series of foreign home sales from the National Association of
Realtors from 2009–2019. The gap between Chinese and all foreign home sales volumes
began to widen over 2013–2014, as the anti-corruption campaign escalated and the tax
polices came into effect in more countries. In what follows, we estimate the effect of this
influx of international capital on U.S. housing markets.
10See Appendix A for details of these tax policies. In addition, New Zealand has recently banned
non-resident foreigners from buying homes, while the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party and the New




In order to differentiate exposure to Chinese capital flowing into the U.S. housing market,
we draw on the network effects methods from Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001),
in which immigrants tend to move to cities in which other immigrants of their same origin
country previously settled. In our context for capital, possibly attached to immigrants
but in many cases unattached, we anticipate that Chinese capital is most likely to flow to
locations with ex-ante high shares of Chinese immigrants. This is the hypothesis we test in
our difference-in-differences specification.
Chinese purchasers may seek to invest their capital in cities with initially high Chinese
populations, and purchase real estate by employing an agent who has worked with Chinese
buyers in the past. Recent work by Badarinza et al. (2019) suggests purchasers of com-
mercial real estate prefer to transact with sellers of the same origin country, regardless in
which country the transaction takes place, while Li, Shen, and Zhang (2019) show a direct
increase in Chinese names among home buyers in areas with prior exposure to many Chi-
nese immigrants. News sources report that Chinese capital has flowed disproportionately
to cities known to have higher than average shares of residents of Asian descent, such as
Melbourne, Sydney, Vancouver, San Francisco, and Seattle.11 These areas are likely attrac-
tive to foreign buyers as they already have familiar language, other cultural infrastructure,
and communities for the foreign buyers. Note, of course, that residential real estate pur-
chases need not be tied to historical immigration networks, as these properties may not be
regularly visited, or visited at all, but instead owned solely for investment purposes.
To define our treatment group, we use data from the 2011 American Community Survey
(ACS) on the number of residents in a zipcode, and the number of residents in a zipcode
11Fong, Dominique, Rachel Pannet and Paul Vieira. “Western Cities Want to Slow Flood of Chinese Home
Buying. Nothing Works.” The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2018. Bradsher, Keith and Dionne Searcey.
“Chinese Cash Floods U.S. Real Estate Market,” The New York Times, Nov. 28, 2015.
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born in a foreign country, by country of origin.12 This dataset allows us to construct the
share of the zipcode’s population originating from any foreign country. For our difference-
in-differences analysis, we define as “treated” those zipcodes whose Chinese immigrant share







The treatment indicator equals 1 for those zipcodes with at least 5.7% foreign-born Chinese
residents, the 99th percentile cutoff. Nationally, the average zipcode in our sample is 0.4%
foreign-born Chinese, with the median zipcode having no Chinese immigrants. For our
instrumental variables approach to estimating the price elasticity of supply, we define a
continuous treatment measure, expanded to all immigrant groups, discussed in section 2.6.
Figure 2.4 shows the geographic distribution of our treatment variable, FBC = 1. Panel
(a) shows that treated zipcodes are clustered in many coastal cities such as New York
City, Seattle, San Fransisco, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Boston. Note that our
treatment definition is not restricted to the coasts; large Chinese immigrant communities
are also present in Houston, Atlanta, and even Nebraska. Panel (b) shows the fraction
of county population that is foreign-born Chinese (used in our housing supply analysis).
Counties shaded in red are treated (by being in the top 1% of counties), and are distributed
across almost every state. Furthermore, 25% of the counties in our sample have at least
0.2% of their total population born in China.
2.3.2. Post Definition
We define our policy intervention date based on Singapore’s first foreign-buyer tax adoption
in 2011q4:
12ACS 5-year estimates, see table DP05 for total population and table B05006 for foreign-born population by
country of origin. The ACS tables are available at the zipcode level from 2011 onwards. The Decennial
Census (2000) provides “Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population” (Table PCT019). There is no
data available between 2001 and 2010.
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Postt = 1{t ≥ 2011q4} (2.2)
Amid all of the tax policy changes listed in Section 2.2.2, we choose the timing of Singapore’s
adoption of the foreign buyer tax as it was the first of its kind and prompted a wave of
similar policies.
2.3.3. House Prices
Our main outcome variable of interest is local house prices. We use CoreLogic’s transactions
database to construct zipcode-level hedonic house price indices from 2000 to 2018. We limit
the sample to the 48 contiguous states as well as Washington, D.C., and only include
zipcodes with at least 20 transactions between 2000 and 2018 to cut down on especially
noisy index construction. Our data contains numerous characteristics of the transacted
home and lot.
We rely on hedonic price indices because it is not feasible to use repeat-sales to quality
control for a housing stock at such small geographies (as there is not enough turnover). Since
the main aim of the repeat-sales index is to control for housing characteristics, we include
a suite of covariates in the hedonic index that capture the variation in housing quality and
characteristics over the time period. As shown in Equation 2.3, for each transaction j we
control for lot size in acres, living square footage, year built, number of bedrooms, number
of bathrooms, and whether the house has a garage. We construct the index separately for
each zipcode i. This yields a zipcode-by-quarter panel of house price indices, hpiit = βit.13
ln(Priceijt) = βitqtrt+δAcresijt+γSqftijt+Builtijt+Bedijt+Bathijt+Garageijt+ηijt (2.3)
13As a robustness check, and to study rental markets, we use Zillow’s Zillow Home Value Index and the
Zillow Rent Index. See Appendix A.8.2.
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After constructing these indices for each zipcode, we limit our sample to 2009–2018 to
avoid the house price collapse in 2007–2008. This yields valid house price indices for 26,040
zipcodes across 2,659 counties, covering 42.5 million transactions. Appendix Table A.10.1
shows the housing characteristics for the zipcode-quarters in our sample.
2.3.4. Additional Economic Data
To study the supply of new housing, we use data from the Census’ Building Permits Survey,
2005–2018. We collect monthly county-level building permits for single– and multi–family
units, aggregating totals to the quarterly level of analysis to be consistent with the house
price indices.
In our matched sample and synthetic control robustness checks, we include a number of real
economic variables to control for local economic characteristics. We use zipcode level annual
employment, establishment counts, and payroll data from the County Business Patterns,
2005–2011. We also include zipcode population data from the 2010 Decennial Census and
2011 zipcode population data and median income from the ACS.
2.3.5. Expected Capital Flows
As our measure of capital flows, we collected data on foreign sales volume from the National
Association of Realtors’ (NAR) Annual Profiles of International Home Buyers from 2011 to
2019. The 2011 report includes data as far back as 2009. Each report provides a national
estimate for the sales volume purchased by international clients originating from Canada,
China, Mexico, India and the United Kingdom, as well as the total sales volume purchased
by all international clients. The estimates are based on a large–scale survey of local realtors.
The NAR defines an international client in two ways: 1) Clients with a permanent residence
outside of the United States, purchasing in the United States for the purpose of investment,
vacation, or stays shorter than 6 months; or 2) Clients who have immigrated to the United
States in the past two years, or who have temporary visas and plan to reside in the United
States for more than 6 months. The NAR profiles do not distinguish between sales volume
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going to the two types of international clients, nor do they provide detailed geography by
source country of these foreign sales.14
2.4. Reduced Form Empirical Design
While the foreign-buyer taxes impact any buyer from a foreign country, no immigrant group
invested as much in the U.S. housing market as the Chinese after the implementation of
these taxes. Chinese home purchase volume more than tripled from $6.8 billion in 2009 to
$31.6 billion in 2017, before falling to $13.4 billion in 2019.15 The difference-in-differences
framework is too blunt a tool to estimate local house price responses to foreign-buyer taxes
without large changes in purchase volumes and meaningful population shares. After showing
that the foreign-buyer taxes do in fact affect local prices and quantities in the reduced
form, we expand the analysis to both include home purchase capital flows other foreign
countries, and relax the treatment condition to use the continuous fraction of the foreign-
born population.
The reduced form analysis compares treated zipcodes, those with high shares of foreign-
born Chinese residents, to control zipcodes, those with lower shares. For the difference–in–
differences design to be valid, treated and control zipcodes must trend similarly in house
prices and quantities absent the tax policy changes that redirect capital to the U.S. housing
market. While panel (a) in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.1 support parallel trends in the pre-period
for housing market characteristics, not all demographic or labor market characteristics are
balanced between treated and control zipcodes. This pattern raises the concern that the
treatment and control groups are not comparable, and that foreign–born purchasers may
sort on house prices, or other neighborhood attributes highly correlated with house prices.
To mitigate these concerns, we modify our differences-in-differences approach by including
14Appendix A.8.3.2 attempts to disentangle whether these international clients contribute to immigration or
population changes.
15Over the same time frame, purchases from Canada grew from $11B to $19B (73%), those from India grew
from $5B to $7.8B (56%), and from the United Kingdom fell from $11.4B to $ 9.5B (-20%). In addition,
local immigrant population shares are much smaller from these countries; the 99th percentile treatment
cutoffs would be 1.7% for the U.K., 2.5% for Canada, and 4% for India.
61
geographic time trends. Going further, we perform additional analysis by constructing a
propensity score matched sample and a synthetic control sample using pre-period data,
using the modified samples in the differences-in-differences approach.
2.4.1. Differences-in-Differences
Our baseline specification in Equation 2.4 uses a generalized difference-in-difference design
for zipcode i in quarter t:
ln(HPIit) = α+ βFBCi × postt + ζi + θt + ηg × θt + εit (2.4)
The parameter of interest is β, which measures the differential house price in treated versus
control zipcodes after Singapore introduced its foreign buyer tax. We also include zipcode,
ζi, and quarter, θt, fixed effects. In order to address concerns that our design is capturing
broader local trends instead of level differences in means, we additionally control for state-
by-quarter, commuting zone-by-quarter, or MSA-by-quarter trends, with trend geography
denoted by g.
These regressions compare zipcodes with relatively larger shares of foreign-born Chinese
population to the rest of the United States. If we are concerned that immigrants invest
in different types of locations relative to domestic U.S. residents, our estimates may suffer
from selection bias. For example, as shown in Figure 2.4, many immigrants locate in
diverse coastal cities such as New York City or San Francisco. These housing markets
are highly inelastic, making house prices sensitive to small changes in demand. If we are
comparing New York City’s price changes to Oklahoma City’s house price changes after
the tax policy change, we would be inflating the impact of the Chinese capital supply by
using an inappropriate control group. We directly address this concern by controlling for
geography-by-time fixed effects to make comparisons exclusively within the same MSA in
the same quarter. Below, we also construct matched samples and apply a synthetic control
method, but we first present the straightforward difference-in-difference estimates using the
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full sample of control zipcodes.
2.5. Establishing the Local Housing Demand Shock
2.5.1. Difference-in-Differences Results
Figure 2.5a presents the comparison between the house prices of high fraction foreign-born
Chinese (FBC) zipcodes, that is, zipcodes in the top 1% of all zipcodes (“treated” zips),
and all other zipcodes (“control” zips). The figure first shows smooth and parallel trends
prior to the start of 2012, after which Chinese capital flows (Chinese home purchases in
the U.S.) increased. After the last quarter of 2011 (indicated by the vertical line), the two
house price series sharply diverge, with treated zipcodes experiencing much greater house
price appreciation between 2012 and 2018.
Table 2.2 formalizes this comparison in our difference-in-differences regression framework,
with associated quarterly event study difference-in-differences coefficients from column (4)
presented in Figure 2.5b. Column (1) of the table includes both quarter and zip fixed
effects, and each column adds progressively more restrictive geography-by-time fixed effects
to flexibly account for different patterns in house prices in different geographies. The
estimated differences in house prices between treated and control zipcodes are consistently
large and statistically significant, ranging from 8 to 17 percent higher in FBC zipcodes,
depending on the specification.16 Our preferred estimate in is column (4), where even after
conditioning on MSA-specific time fixed effects, we estimate that after 2012, house prices
in high foreign-born Chinese zipcodes were 7.8 percent greater than control zipcodes in the
same MSA.
Decomposing the treatment group into a more continuous treatment measure, Table 2.3
shows the house price changes for zipcodes with foreign-born Chinese population shares
in the 50th − 90th percentiles, 90th − 95th percentiles, 95th − 99th percentiles, and above
16Standard errors are clustered by quarter in column (1), and in the other columns are clustered at the level
of geography associated with the geography-specific time fixed effects.
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99th percentile relative to the lower half of the distribution of zipcodes (which contain no
foreign-born Chinese residents). The results are consistent with the more blunt treatment
measure: house prices rose the most in zipcodes with higher shares of foreign-born Chinese
residents. Specifically, in our preferred specification in column (4), we find that zipcodes in
the 99th percentile of foreign-born Chinese share see house prices 13% higher than those in
the bottom half of the distribution. However, the zipcodes need not be that concentrated;
zipcodes in the 95th − 99th percentiles see a 6 percent house price increase, the 90th − 95th
percentiles see a house price increase of 3 percent, and the 50th−90th percentiles a 2 percent
increase.
A notable feature of Chinese buyers of U.S. housing is that they tend to purchase relatively
more expensive properties than either other foreign buyers or domestic U.S. buyers. As
mentioned above, the average house price for Chinese buyers at their peak purchasing
volume in 2017 is over $780,000, while other foreign buyers spend $537,000 and domestic
buyers spend $278,000 on average (National Association of Realtors 2017). This difference
may reflect the fact that Chinese and other foreign nationals buy more expensive houses in
low-price communities, or, more likely, that they tend to locate in high-price communities.
We thus investigate whether the responsiveness of house prices to Chinese capital flows is
concentrated in the most expensive tier of housing. If house prices responded in all tiers, we
might be concerned that other drivers of price appreciation, such as local labor markets or
improved amenities, were instead contributing to the house price appreciation we document.
In Figure 2.6a, we separately plot the path of house prices for those high foreign-born
Chinese zipcodes in the top quintile of the U.S. house price distribution (in red), and for
those in the other four quintiles (in blue). The time series of house prices for all other
zipcodes is plotted in black. Prior to 2012, the three house price series have nearly identical
trends. Starting in the first quarter of 2012, the house price series for the foreign-born
Chinese zipcodes in the top quintile of prices diverges sharply from the other two series and
stays persistently higher through the end of 2018. Table 2.4 reproduces the difference-in-
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differences specifications of Table 2.2, but interacts the “FBC” treatment indicator with the
quintile of the house price distribution of U.S. zipcodes, grouping the bottom four quintiles
into one indicator. The table shows minimal differences for zipcodes in the bottom four
quintiles, with most of the effect of Chinese capital flows after 2012 concentrated in the high
foreign-born Chinese zipcodes in the top 20 percent of the initial house price distribution.
Not only does foreign capital flow to immigrant heavy communities, column (4) in Table
2.4 shows it targets expensive zipcodes within a local market.
Has this increase in house prices, induced by an influx of foreign capital, translated into
real economic effects? In Table 2.5 we explore this question, using data on the construction
of new residential buildings from the U.S. Census’ Building Permits Survey, as discussed
in Section 2.3.4. The data is less granular than the house price indices we constructed
from transaction data, and is instead available at the county-by-quarter level. The table
presents estimates from difference-in-difference specifications similar to those in Table 2.2.
The dependent variable is defined as the cumulative new stock (sum of all permits between







In column (3), our preferred specification that includes state-specific time controls, we
estimate that high foreign-born Chinese zipcodes experienced 0.47 percentage points more
additional stock per year after 2012. This coefficient translates to an additional 3% growth
in the stock of housing relative to 2011 after 7 years, providing new evidence that Chinese
capital flows have had a direct and local effect on real construction activity in the United
States.
In sum, in this section we have documented differential house price and housing supply
growth in zipcodes that were ex-ante more likely to be destinations for Chinese capital,
namely those with a larger pre-existing foreign-born Chinese population. In contrast, we
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find no differential house price effects in other zipcodes that may be affected by international
capital flows, but that are not destinations with pre-existing relationships with large shares
of Chinese residents.
2.5.2. Robustness to Counterfactual Construction:
Matching and Synthetic Control Approaches
While the prior section provides straightforward evidence of similar patterns prior to 2012
and divergence thereafter between high foreign-born Chinese zipcodes and all other zipcodes,
a natural concern might be that the drivers of house price growth may not necessarily have
evolved in parallel across these two groups of neighborhoods. In addition, given that our
approach to defining “treatment” is to focus on the top 1% of zipcodes in terms of foreign-
born Chinese residents, there may be concerns with including other high-percentile zipcodes
in the “control” group, when the treatment of increased capital flows may instead affect the
top 5%, 10% or 25% of zipcodes (as suggested by Table 2.3).
In this section, we address this concern by creating two new counterfactual house price
trends based on propensity score matching and synthetic control techniques. As both ap-
proaches yield results that are very similar to those of the baseline difference-in-differences
design, we describe the matching exercise here and report on the synthetic control approach
in Appendix Section A.8.1.
To construct a matched control group, we first restrict the sample to those with the fraction
of foreign-born Chinese below the 75th percentile. This restriction, which limits the foreign-
born Chinese population to at most 0.3 percent, addresses the issue related to the arbitrary
cutoff of the top 1%. Next, we keep only those MSAs with at least one zipcode in the top
1% in order to match on MSA. Third, we generate a propensity score for each zipcode by
regressing (probit) FBCi on zipcode-level characteristics from 2010 and 2011. We include
demographic, economic, and housing characteristics, listed in Table 2.1. Fourth, we match
one nearest-neighbor control zipcode within the same MSA to each treated zipcode with
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replacement.17
Figure 2.7 presents the time series of house prices for the matched control group, in blue, and
the treatment group (same series as in Figure 2.5a) in red. The two house price series are
on the same trends in the pre-period, and then diverge starting in 2012 (the vertical line).
Table 2.6 presents results from difference-in-difference specifications similar to those above,
this time using the matched control group (hence the much smaller number of observations).
The results are quite stable regardless of the specificity of geography-by-time fixed effects,
with estimated differences in prices between 8 and 17 percent for more foreign-born Chinese
locations relative to their matched counterparts.
The findings from this matching exercise suggest that our estimates are not particularly
sensitive to the choice of control group when conducting the difference-in-differences esti-
mation. In Appendix Section A.8.1, we conduct an additional counterfactual construction
exercise using synthetic control techniques, and find relatively precisely estimated house
price differences of around 11 percent between high foreign-born Chinese zipcodes and their
“synthetic” counterparts. In Appendix Section A.8.2, we use the zipcode-level Zillow Home
Value Index (ZHVI), and the results remain robust.
We conclude that these additional approaches to constructing plausible counterfactual house
price paths support the broader difference-in-differences assumptions related to parallel
trends: Namely, that this influx of Chinese capital represented an unexpected shock to local
housing markets, and that the neighborhoods affected by this shock were predominantly
those with high ex-ante exposure in the form of a larger share of foreign-born Chinese
residents.
2.6. Price and Quantity Elasticities
Having established that the introduction of foreign buyer taxes increased house prices in
areas with high fractions of foreign-born Chinese populations, we now address the more gen-
17Appendix Table A.10.2 presents the covariate balance between FBC and non-FBC zipcodes after matching.
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eral question of how liquid foreign capital impacts local asset prices and quantities, with the
goal of constructing local house price elasticities of supply. Disentangling causality between
global capital flows and local asset prices is challenging. International capital may raise
local house prices as global capital searches for return and settles in local housing invest-
ments, the story motivating this paper. On the other hand, local communities may draw
global capital to their own local markets in the United States through immigration, educa-
tional spending, or reverse remittances. Americans also demand foreign currencies in order
to purchase goods produced abroad. Adding measurement error, foreigners supply capital
in many ways, by investing in U.S. firms, buying U.S. government debt, and purchasing
commercial real estate, in addition to their investments in residential real estate.
In our setting, the series of foreign buyer tax policies adopted by other countries serve as
an exogenous demand shifter into the United States housing market. We use this expansion
of capital supply interacted with the fraction of the zipcode that is foreign born in 2011
(fracFBi) to instrument for capital flows into the United States. In addition, we use
the home purchase capital flows measure discussed in Section 2.3.5, instead of a more
general gross capital flow measure, to reduce measurement error introduced by different
types of foreign investors, such as firms or governments. By using home purchase capital
flows in conjunction with variation targeting home purchasing, we can estimate the more
fundamental elasticities of interest: the elasticity of price with respect to foreign capital,
and the elasticity of supply with respect to foreign capital. Taking those two elasticities
together, we can construct a new measure of the price elasticity of supply for local U.S.
housing markets.
The instrumental variable design requires satisfaction of both the relevance condition and
the exclusion restriction. The relevance condition in this context requires that more cap-
ital flows into the U.S. housing market after other countries impose foreign buyer taxes
[Formally, E[ ̂ln(ECFit)(fracFBi × Postt)] 6= 0]. Panel (a) in Figure 2.1 shows graphically
that there is a visual positive correlation. Additionally, the reduced form empirical results
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presented above show that the instrument has a positive correlation on the second stage
outcome variable. Finally, we can perform first stage tests to show positive correlation with
a high F-statistic.
The exclusion restriction requires that foreign buyer tax policy changes only impact U.S.
house prices by diverting capital into the housing market, E[εit(fracFBi × Postt)] = 0. A
violation of this restriction would have foreign buyer taxes imposed on real estate purchases
impacting the U.S. housing market through another mechanism besides direct investment
in homes. Investment in the local economy more broadly, such as in local businesses,
would be one example. In the reduced form empirics section, we control for precisely this
concern using geographic trends, matching, and synthetic control estimators. Additionally,
in Appendix A.9.1, we test whether investments related to growth in the tech industry
violate the exclusion restriction, and find no support for this alternative explanation.
2.6.1. Expected Capital Flows IV
Because we are no longer estimating a simple comparison in means in response to a blunt
tax policy, we introduce capital flows and populations from other foreign countries into
our analysis. We now include home purchase volume as our measure of capital flows from
China, Canada, India, Mexico, the U.K. and “other” foreign countries, provided by the
NAR, denoted by capflowct. Figure 2.8 shows the contribution of these top 5 international
client groups to the overall international sales volume from 2010–2019. The darkest bar, at
the bottom of the graph, is the Chinese contribution to the total. Next is Canada, followed
by India, Mexico and the U.K. in that order. Finally, the bar is capped by the “all other
foreign” contribution. The figure shows the rapid expansion of Chinese investment in U.S.
residential real estate relative to other foreign buyers over this period, but also that the
Chinese bar alone makes up a relatively small fraction of total foreign investment.
We construct a measure of local expected capital flows (ECFit) that distributes national

















and C = {Canada, China, India, Mexico, U.K., Other}, i denotes zipcode, and t denotes
quarter. Intuitively, ECFit distributes capital coming from country c at time t, capflowct,
to zipcode i based on how many people from country c ex-ante live in that zipcode relative to
their national presence; in other words, ECFit is the expected capital flowing to a zipcode,
should the national flows be distributed uniformly by population.18 We can also scale the
per-capita term by the zipcode share of the relevant foreign-born population, fracFBic, to
define an exposure measure. The exposure measure methods and results are discussed in
Appendix A.9.2. We choose to focus on the per-capita ECFit measure due to its ease of
interpretation.19
Appendix Table A.10.10 provides a numerical example of the ECFit construction for zipcode
19104, the home of the University of Pennsylvania. In 2011, there were 140 Canadians, 2175
Chinese, 754 Indians, 220 Mexicans, 185 residents from the UK, and 3,845 other foreign
residents. Their respective national population totals were, 811k, 2.2m, 1.9m, 11.6m, 689k,
18This intuition is similar to a Bartik instrument, in which the local industry shares are the population
shares, and the national industry growth rate is national foreign capital flows. Identification uses
differential exposure to a common shock, in our case the the foreign–buyer tax policy change.
Identification relies on the initial population shares being exogenous to house price growth or quantity
growth. Goldsmith-Pinkham, et al. (2019) suggest testing this by examining how much the initial shares
are correlated with confounders in the pre–period. We test at length in the reduced form empirics, for
example by constructing a matched sample and synthetic controls.
19While the CoreLogic transactions data contains the buyers’ names listed on deeds, these are frequently
omitted or provide the name of a legal entity (e.g. LLC), which precludes us from directly estimating the
fraction of foreign buyers based, say, on the last name of the buyer.
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and 23m. In 2017q1, 4.75 $B in capital flowed to the U.S. from Canada, 7.9 from China, 1.95
from India, 2.325 from Mexico, 2.375 from the UK and 18.9 from other foreign countries.
Calculating the interior piece of the sum for each country yields the volume from country
c in 2017q1, in zipcode 19104, V olume19104,c,2017q1, should national volumes be distributed
per-capita: $0.82m for Canada, $7.67m for China, $0.78m for India, $0.04m for Mexico,
$0.64m for the UK, and $3.15m for all other foreigners. Summing together, we expect
zipcode 19104 to gain $13.1m in foreign home purchase capital in 2017q1 based on the
pre-existing distribution of foreign residents.
Figure A.11.4 shows the ECFit distributions for 2009q1 and 2015q1, based on the pre–
existing composition of foreign–born residents, with panel (a) showing the raw distribution,
and panel (b) showing the logged distribution, which drops all zipcodes with no foreign-
born residents. In 2009q1, the median zip code in a CBSA with at least one treated zipcode
received $176,000 in ECFit, which translates to about one home purchased by a foreigner
assuming a price at the national average at the time of about $173,000.20 This increased
to $322,000 in 2015q1 and to $418,000 by 2018q1. The 99th percentile zip code in 2009q1
received $4.2 million, $17.1 million in 2015q1, and $20 million in 2018q1. In short, our
new measure of expected capital flows ECFit shows there is wide variance in the amount
of money flowing to individual locations, and that over time, every zipcode has seen an
increase in local capital flows.
Our multinational IV design proceeds as follows:
ln(ECFit) = α+ βfracFBi × Postt + ζi + θt + εit (2.8)
ln(HPIit) = δ + γP ̂ln(ECFit) + ζi + θt + εit (2P)
dQit
Qi
= δ + γQ ̂ln(ECFit) + ζi + θt + εit (2Q)
20According to Zillow’s National All Homes Index, ZHVI.
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In the first stage, β measures the percent change in capital (in millions of dollars) in treated
zipcodes in the post period. In the second stage, γ measures the elasticity of house prices
or quantities with respect to an increase in expected local foreign capital.21 dQQ measures
the number of building permits in a county i at time t, relative to the same county’s stock
in 2011.22
2.6.2. Expected Capital Flows IV Results
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present the results from the expected capital flows estimation strategy.
We present the price results using both the panel of zipcodes and the panel of counties,
while the quantity results use the panel of counties due to data availability. We show in
Table 2.7, column (1), that ECFit, the expected foreign capital flowing to a zipcode, is
strongly associated with the interaction of the foreign-born share of the population and an
indicator for post-2012 time periods. This instrument yields an F-statistic of 690, even after
the inclusion of zipcode and quarter fixed effects. The estimate of 0.9 implies that moving
from 0% fraction foreign-born to 100% fraction foreign-born (fracFBi ∈ [0, 1]) is associated
with an 80% increase in quarterly capital flows in the post period. The median zip code
has a fraction foreign-born of 2.2%, and the 99th percentile is 43% foreign-born. Moving
between these two would increase expected capital flows by 33%. Column (2) shows the
first-stage results with the panel of counties for the price outcomes, with the point estimate
increasing from 0.9 to 1.06. Finally, the third column shows the first stage for the panel
of counties for which we have building permit data, and yields a first stage semi-elasticity
of 1.14 with an F-statistic of 59, again demonstrating a strong first stage, as supported by
section 2.5.1.
21γ is likely attenuated towards 0 since ECF is an imperfect measure of local FDI in the housing market.













well, so we use the log–log specification for HPI as it is
well–estimated in the quarterly data, at a local level. By contrast, the data quality for annual housing
stock from the ACS is very noisy. As such, we use quarterly permits data, dQit, normalized to pre–period
stock, Qi.
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Table 2.8 reports our estimates of the elasticity of zipcode house prices and quantities on
the zipcode’s ECFit, instrumented with the interaction of fraction foreign-born and the
post-2012 indicator. Column (1) shows that a 1% increase in ECFit raises house prices by
0.62%, when using a panel of zipcodes. Column (3) in table 2.8 reports the comparable
quantity elasticity; a 1% increase in expected capital flows to a zipcode increase quantities
by 0.004%, showing that quantities are less than one-tenth as responsive as prices in the
short run.
As we show in the Appendix, this local instrumental variables approach is robust to ex-
cluding China from both numerator and denominator of ECFit. Appendix Table A.10.12
shows that the second stage results remain similar, at 0.61 to 0.86 for prices and 0.004 for
quantities, showing that while Chinese capital flows might be the most newsworthy, the
rest of the world’s capital also flows into the U.S. market, increasing prices. The results
are also robust to alternative approaches of constructing ECFit. For instance, in Appendix
A.9.2, we weight the ECFit by the fraction foreign-born in the zipcode, analogous to the
exposure treatment measure in ongoing work by Abramitzky and Boustan on the impact of
immigration quotas on local economies.23 This alternative weighting scheme is constructed
to take into consideration the number of people in a zip code; however, a zip code with 10
foreign-born residents out of 20 may attract capital differently than one with 10 out of 100.
By scaling the ECFit, we find a price elasticity of 0.66 (see Appendix Table A.10.14), and
a quantity elasticity of 0.006, in line with our main results.
In sum, in this section we constructed a generalized instrument for international capital
flows based on ex–ante foreign population shares, and used foreign-buyer taxes in non-U.S.
countries to show that U.S. house prices and quantities respond to international capital
flows.
23Abramitzky and Boustan (2019) interact the foreign-born population share from a given origin country
with their measure of immigration quota bindingness, or intensity of treatment. In their setting, the
intensity of the quota stringency will matter more in areas with high shares of foreign born populations. In
our setting, the intensity of treatment is the expected capital flows to a zipcode.
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2.7. Local House Price Elasticities of Supply
To estimate house price elasticities of supply across local housing markets, we use variation
in the demand for housing induced by international tax policy changes, which is plausibly
exogenous to local housing supply decision-makers, interacted with the tax policy change.
Intuitively, local housing markets will be differentially shocked by foreign demand, depend-
ing on their pre–period foreign–born composition. This provides a unique demand shift for
each market, holding the initial supply of housing fixed.
The ratio of the elasticities of price,
∂ln(P )
∂ln(f) , and supply,
∂ln(Q)
∂ln(f) , with respect to capital
flows from the multicountry IV second stage results can be used to construct the house







∂ln(P ) = η (2.9)
While a national house price elasticity is informative, we care more about how localities
differ in their supply responses to price changes in the short run. Compared to previous
work describing local house price elasticities, especially through the lens of housing supply
restrictions either due to regulation or topography (Gyourko, et. al. 2008; Saiz 2010), we
exploit exogenous variation in demand for housing to estimate the slope of the supply curve.
Additionally, we can construct an elasticity for any geography that has exposure to the tax
policy shock, i.e. any location with a nonzero share of foreign-born residents, fracFBi. We
choose to construct elasticities at the CBSA level, which allows for variation across counties
in fracFB within the same CBSA.
To obtain local house price elasticities for each CBSA m, ηM , we modify the instrumental
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variables strategy discussed in Section 2.6. First, we use the county as the unit of ob-
servation, as this is the granularity available for building permits, our measure of dQct,
normalized to the 2011 stock, Qc. We instrument for capital flows, ECFct, with fraction
foreign–born interacted with the “post” indicator, fracFBc×Postt, and regress prices and
quantities on instrumented capital flows:
ln(HPIct) = γP ̂ln(ECF ct ) + γPM ̂ln(ECF ct )× CBSAc + ηct (2PM)
dQct
Qc
= γQ ̂ln(ECF ct ) + γ
Q
M
̂ln(ECF ct )× CBSAc + νct (2QM)
This design allows us to estimate both a short–run national and local impact of capital flows
on house prices and quantities: γk for the average national elasticity, γkM for the CBSA–
specific additional elasticity. To recover the distribution of price elasticities of supply, for
each CBSA we then calculate
ηM =
γQ + γQM
γP + γP (2.10)
ηM provides the CBSA–specific house price elasticity of supply. We construct ηM for the
largest 100 CBSA’s by population in 2010, mapped in Figure 2.9, a sample of which is
displayed in Table 2.9.24 The most inelastic cities in our sample have price elasticities
of supply of about 0.02, while the most elastic have an elasticity closer to 0.7.25 The
map in Figure 2.9 shows the geographic distribution of the elasticities, dividing the 91
positive values into 4 quartiles. The most inelastic markets tend to be on the coasts,
though Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN turns out to be one of our empirically most inelastic
24The full table of elasticities by CBSA is provided in Appendix A.10.
25Based on our methodology, nine CBSAs have negative elasticities: Greenville, NC, Columbus, GA, Detroit,
MI, Deltona, FL, Wilmington, NC, Allentown, PA, Tallahassee, FL, Vineland, NJ, and Atlantic City, NJ.
These CBSA’s represent cities in decline and cities that overbuilt in the last housing cycle, for which either
the price elasticity with respect to foreign capital, or the quantity elasticity is negative.
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markets.26 The middle of the country remains relatively more elastic, though large areas of
the Mid–Atlantic also seem elastically supplied over this period.
Figure 2.10 provides the distribution of local house price elasticities, with the bulk of short
term elasticities falling below 0.1. This figure shows that over a ten-year period, the U.S.
housing market appears to be highly inelastically supplied. That we observe such inelastic
markets is perhaps unsurprising given the historic sustained growth in house prices over
the duration of our sample, with the Case–Shiller national house price index rising over 40
percent from 2010q1 to 2018q4. This rise in prices has not been driven by an expansion
of credit or a large construction response that characterized the housing bubble of 2003–
2007, the last time we saw such sharp price increases. Taking the example of the Boston
CBSA, which has an estimated elasticity of 0.03, we can ground these elasticities in observed
changes in prices and quantities. In 2010, the average home transacted for $350k, and there
were 1.7 million units in the CBSA. This implies that a 1% change in price of $3,500 would
result in 0.03 × 0.01 × 1.7 million ≈ 510 more housing units in response to this demand
shock. At the CBSA level, house prices rose by 35%, implying an additional 18k units would
be built between 2010 and 2018.
To better understand the mechanics of our instrument, we plot observed and predicted
price and quantity changes for our sample of the 100 largest cities. Panel (c) in Figure 2.11
plots the predicted and raw price and quantity changes from the data. We observe that
the slope for the predicted values (left panel) is much steeper than the slope for the raw
change (right panel). The intuition for this disparity is shown in panels (a) and (b). If
we use only a demand shock to the local housing market, a large change in P is associated
with a large change in Q; however, if we do not hold the supply of housing fixed, and fail
to isolate a pure demand shock, a large change in Q is associated with a small change in P.
Panel (c) then shows that our IV design solves this simultaneity problem; large changes in
Q are now associated with large changes in P for the predicted panel, while large changes
26Aastveit, Albuquerque, and Anundsen (2018) also unexpectedly find that Minneapolis is highly inelastic.
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in Q are associated with small changes in P for the raw equilibria. The average elasticity
for the predicted panel (weighted by city size) is lower than that for the raw equilibria,
ηMpredicted = 0.16 < 0.59 = ηMraw, highlighting the need for an instrument to isolate the
demand shock, and the apparent success of our natural experiment in doing so.
2.8. Conclusion
International capital flows have the potential to rapidly generate asset bubbles, and de-
flate them just as quickly. While some asset bubbles may not necessarily have meaningful
implications for the real economy, inflating physical assets such as real estate can distort
economic activity towards home construction at the expense of other industries. In this pa-
per, we document the effect of large capital outflows from China on the U.S. housing market,
emphasizing that a series of foreign-buyer taxes in other target housing markets may have
made American cities more attractive investments. Using a difference-in-differences design,
we estimate that house prices rose 8 to 15 percent more in zipcodes with a larger share of
foreign-born Chinese residents prior to the capital shock.
Estimating the housing market’s sensitivity to global capital more generally, we find that a
1% increase in instrumented foreign capital raises house prices at the zip code level by 0.6,
and housing supply at the county level by 0.004%. We then exploit this demand shock to
provide new estimates of the elasticity of house prices with respect to global capital inflows
into the U.S. housing market. We find that U.S. housing markets seem relatively inelastic
in the short run, with the average city having an house price elasticity of supply near 0.11
over a ten year period.
Our findings have three primary implications. First, we establish that foreign-buyer taxes,
generally imposed in response to Chinese investment, have spillovers in other target mar-
kets; for instance, imposing foreign buyer taxes in Vancouver has affected Seattle’s housing
market. Next, we show that neighborhoods with a large share of foreign residents are more
susceptible to house price swings in response to capital flows. From an affordability stand-
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point, these neighborhoods are less accessible to existing U.S. residents as prices rise due to
foreign investment. However, we also show that the real economy responds to these signals,
with new construction adding an additional 3% of housing stock in the same neighbor-
hoods. Finally, we document that the U.S. housing market is highly inelastic in the short
run, but heterogeneous across cities. Our results are consistent with the recent rise in house
prices nationally leading to the affordability crisis, as cities are not rapidly adding stock in
response.
Whether this expansion of the housing stock in high-exposure neighborhoods is a bubble
or not depends on how these homes are used and whether capital continues to flow to the
same destination zipcodes. If these homes are used only as frequently-unoccupied pied-à-
terre, this usage will not provide any local economic activity, and will increase the housing
costs of other residents competing to live in the same neighborhood. If foreign countries
tighten their capital controls, as China has reportedly succeeded in doing, capital may flow
elsewhere and local markets may be oversupplied with investment properties.27 Given the
durability of housing, the costs of overbuilding could be large and persistent (e.g. Glaeser
and Gyourko (2005)). While our analysis establishes the consequences of capital inflows on
U.S. house prices, the impact of capital outflows, if foreign nationals choose to repatriate
capital or move their funds elsewhere, remains an area of further research.




Table 2.1: Covariate Balance
Variable FBC=0 FBC=1 Difference
HPI 1.976 1.888 -0.074
(1.499) (0.947) (0.108)
HPI growth, 1 Year 0.041 0.039 0.002
(0.473) (0.379) (0.015)
HPI growth, 5 Years 0.307 0.359 0.057
(0.861) (0.824) (0.058)
Lagged HPI 1.957 1.894 -0.052
(1.412) (0.924) (0.107)
Sales 47.533 54.946 3.806
(63.620) (49.402) (3.914)
Lagged Sales 50.086 55.463 1.903
(64.917) (49.641) (4.042)
Permits: Single Family Units 1,403.915 2,012.000 478.352
(3,445.920) (3,527.558) (672.553)
Permits: All Units 2,220.648 5,550.035 3,123.131**
(5,150.242) (6,479.830) (1,364.078)
Establishments 390.730 1,055.530 638.459***
(464.619) (750.433) (51.042)
Estab. growth, 1 year -0.001 0.008 0.008***
(0.075) (0.037) (0.002)
Estab. growth, 5 years -0.010 0.027 0.034***
(0.178) (0.104) (0.009)
Employment 6,059.159 17,673.475 11,180.679***
(9,004.811) (17,567.438) (1,428.239)
Emp. growth, 1 year 0.003 0.009 0.002
(0.162) (0.201) (0.004)
Emp. growth, 5 years -0.005 -0.010 -0.007
(0.378) (0.196) (0.016)
Annual Payroll (1000s) 241.617 1,098.492 838.187***
(546.318) (1,560.161) (150.819)
2010 Population 16,280.107 34,627.074 17,224.406***
(15,861.714) (21,414.273) (1,680.279)
2011 Population 16,177.837 34,163.547 16,872.781***
(15,766.526) (21,106.248) (1,612.878)
2011 Median Income 55,501.430 80,097.359 23,285.756***
(21,700.305) (34,987.082) (4,515.230)







for zipcode i. Data is zipcode level, excepting permits data, which is at
the county level. Data at the quarterly level, excepting annual employment, establishment, and payroll
data. Data through 2011q3 for the housing and permit data, and through 2012 for the annual data. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered by MSA. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.2: Differences-in-Differences Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPI HPI HPI HPI
Post=1 X FBC=1 0.118∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.0781∗ 0.0950∗∗
(0.0693) (0.0316) (0.0435) (0.0385)
R2 0.869 0.899 0.889 0.891
Observations 86768 428903 163355 176224
Fixed Effects
Quarter X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Quarter X
MSA X Quarter X
Zone X Quarter X
Notes: This table shows the coefficient β from hpiit = α+ βFBCi × Postt + ζi + θt + εit. FBC=1 defined






for zipcode i. All data at the zipcode by quarter level. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.3: Binned Dose Response Results, FBC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPI HPI HPI HPI
Post = 1 X 50th-90th ptile 0.0377 0.0411∗∗ 0.0393 0.0223
(0.0372) (0.0143) (0.0310) (0.0317)
Post = 1 X 90th-95th ptile -0.00285 0.0762 0.0379 0.0246
(0.0750) (0.0498) (0.0557) (0.0536)
Post = 1 X 95th-99th ptile 0.0555 0.139∗∗ 0.0771 0.0644
(0.0641) (0.0590) (0.0665) (0.0572)
Post = 1 X Above 99th ptile 0.200∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.131∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.0972) (0.0462) (0.0686) (0.0515)
R2 0.869 0.899 0.889 0.891
Observations 86768 428877 163355 176224
Fixed Effects
Quarter X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Quarter X
MSA X Quarter X
Zone X Quarter X
Notes: This table shows the coefficients βk from hpiit = α +
∑
k
βkFBCbinik × Postt + ζi + θt + εit. All
data at the zipcode by quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography
of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: Differences-in-Differences Results, by house price quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPI HPI HPI HPI
Post = 1 X FBC X quintile 1-4 -0.228∗∗ 0.0358 0.0496 0.0638
(0.102) (0.0697) (0.0760) (0.0755)
Post = 1 X FBC X quintile 5 0.140∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.0800∗ 0.0971∗∗
(0.0706) (0.0358) (0.0456) (0.0402)
R2 0.869 0.899 0.889 0.891
Observations 86744 428879 163331 176200
Fixed Effects
Quarter X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Quarter X
MSA X Quarter X
Zone X Quarter X
Notes: This table shows the coefficient β from hpiit = α+ βFBCquinti ×Postt + ζi + θt + εit. All data at
the zipcode by quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography of time
trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.5: Differences-in-Differences, Supply Response
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Units New Units New Units New Units
Post = 1 X FBC = 1 0.399∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.128) (0.147) (0.117)
R2 0.658 0.716 0.767 0.781
Observations 17200 14963 6034 5711
Fixed Effects
Quarter X X X X
County X X X X
State X Quarter X
MSA X Quarter X
Zone X Quarter X












for county i. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography of time trend. Signifi-
cance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Matching Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post=1 X FBC=1 0.168 0.122 0.119 0.0817
(0.127) (0.0902) (0.104) (0.108)
R2 0.745 0.772 0.773 0.774
Observations 11550 11550 11550 11550
Fixed Effects
Quarter X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Quarter X
MSA X Quarter X
Zone X Quarter X
Notes: This table shows the coefficient β from hpiit = α+βFBCi×Postt+ ζi+ θt+ εit, using the matched
sample. All data at the zipcode by quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or
by geography of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.7: Expected Capital Flow IV: First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
ln(ECF_it) ln(ECF_it) ln(ECF_it)
Post X Frac. FB 0.891∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0891) (0.148)
R2 0.987 0.998 0.996
F 690.3 140.5 59.35
Observations 812746 95643 26446
Fixed Effects
Zip X
Quarter X X X
County X X
Notes: This table shows the first stage results from ln(ECFit) = α + βfrac_FBi × Postt + ζi + θt + εit.
All data mean collapsed at the quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by geography.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.8: Expected Capital Flow IV: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)
ln(HPI) ln(HPI) Total Units
ln(ECF_it) 0.624∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.00420∗∗∗
(0.0823) (0.128) (0.00109)
Root MSE 1.442 0.186 0.00193
Observations 812143 95623 26446
Fixed Effects
Zip X
Quarter X X X
County X X
Notes:The table shows the second stage results from Yit = δ+γ ̂ln(ECFit) + ζi + θt + εit, where Yit is either
ln(hpiit) or dQitQit , and i is either zipcode or county. All data mean collapsed at the quarter level. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.9: Most Inelastic and Elastic CBSA’s
Top 5 Most Inelastic
Providence, RI 0.02
San Francisco, CA 0.03
Boston, MA 0.03
Minneapolis – St. Paul, MN 0.03
Sacramento, CA 0.03




Virginia Beach - Norfolk, VA 0.35
Trenton, NJ 0.27
Note: This table shows 10 of the 100 price elasticities of supply, for the most inelastic and
elastic CBSA’s in the country.
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2.10. Figures



















2009q3 2011q3 2013q3 2015q3 2017q3
Quarter
Data taken from China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange, time series of balance of payments
Capital flows defined as the quarterly sum of the following:
2.2.1.2. Portfolio Investment, 2.2.1.4. Other Investment, and 3. Net errors and omissions































2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
year
Chinese All Foreign
(b) Sales Volume, NAR
Source: Capital outflows from SAFE, time series of balance of payments, and are defined as the quarterly
sum of: 2.2.1.2. Portfolio Investment, 2.2.1.4. Other Investment, and 3. Net errors and omissions.
Transaction volume from NAR’s “2017 Profile of International Activity in U.S. Residential Real Estate.”
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Sales HPI
(e) British Columbia, Canada






































2010m1 2012m1 2014m1 2016m1 2018m1 2020m1
datem
Sales Change HPI Change
(f) Ontario, Canada
Source: For Singapore, data from data.gov.sg for private residential property price index. For Hong
Kong, data from the Bank for International Settlements via St. Louis Fred, source code Q:HK:R:628, real
residential property prices. For Australia, data from Australian Bureau of Statistics, residential property
price indexes by city. For Canada, data from Teranet and National Bank of Canada, residential property
price indexes by city.
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Figure 2.3: Tax Policy Changes
2011 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018
Notes: Singapore: 10% in 2011m12, 15% in 2013m1, 20% in 2018m7; Australia: 3 % in 2015m6 (VIC),
4% in 2016m6 (NSW), 7% in 2016m7 (VIC), 8% in 2017m7; Canada: 15% in 2016m8 (BC), 15% in
2017m4 (ON), 20% in 2018m2; New Zealand: banned all non-resident foreigners from purchasing existing
SFHs, may still purchase up to 60% of new construction multiunit condos, 2018m8. Other policies include
taxes on vacant units, often at lower rates. The United Kingdom and Malaysia are currently considering
imposing similar policies.
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Figure 2.4: Geographic Spread of Treated Zips and Counties
(a) Zip Codes
(b) Counties
Note: Panel (a) plots the FBC=1 zipcodes. Panel (b) plots the fraction foreign-born Chinese by county,
breakpoints correspond to the 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles. Treated counties shaded in red.
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2009q1 2011q3 2014q1 2016q3 2019q1
Quarter
Capital flows out of China
DiD estimator: Treatment-Control
(b) DiD Estimator
Note: Panel (b) uses regression estimates from the baseline DiD, adding city-level trends, as in column
(4) of the DiD results: hpiit = βFBCi × qtrt + ζi + θt +MSAi × t+ εit.







2009q1 2011q3 2014q1 2016q3 2019q1
Quarter
Control Zips Treated Price Q1,2,3,4
Treated Price Q5
Note: The figure uses regression estimates from the price qauntile DiD, adding city-level trends, as in
column (4) of the DiD results: hpiit = βFBCi × qtrt + ζi + θt +MSAi × t+ εit.
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2009q1 2011q3 2014q1 2016q3 2019q1
Quarter
Capital flows out of China
DiD estimator: Treatment-Control
(b) DiD Estimator
Note: Panel (b) uses regression estimates from the baseline DiD, adding city-level trends, as in column
(4) of the matching results: hpiit = βFBCi × qtrt + ζi + θt +MSAi × t+ εit.





















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
China Canada India
Mexico UK Other
Source: Transaction volume by country from NAR’s annual “Profile of International Activity in U.S.
Residential Real Estate.” Capital outflows from SAFE, time series of balance of payments, and are defined
as the quarterly sum of: 2.2.1.2. Portfolio Investment, 2.2.1.4. Other Investment, and 3. Net errors and
omissions.
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Note: This map shows the distribution of house price elasticities. Blue CBSA’s are the most observably
inelastic (top quartile), followed by navy, then purple, and finally the red are the most elastic qaurtile
of CBSA elasticities. Yellow CBSA’s denote negative elasticities. Gray CBSA’s are those we see in the
data but which are not in the top 100 CBSA’s by population. White regions have no data in any of our
samples.
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Price Elasticity of Supply
Note: This histogram shows the distribution of house price elasticities. Red bars denote negative elastici-
ties.
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Figure 2.11: Endogeneity Issues in Estimating House Price Elasticities
(a) Isolating Demand Response (b) Supply and Demand Response
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Note: This figure highlights the endogeneity problem of using observed house price and quantity changes
to estimate local house price elasticity of supply. Panel (a) shows the ideal experiment, an exogenous
demand shifter. Panel (b) shows the problem in extrapolating the slope from observational data; drawing
a line between points A and C creates a falsely flatter supply curve. The left hand scatter in panel (c)
shows the top 91 CBSA’s price and quantities estimated using our IV design strategy, while the right hand
side scatter shows the raw data, without isolating the demand shifter from the supply shifter.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Your Uber has Arrived: Other App Adoption
As a final robustness check, it is important to consider other sources of variation in restau-
rant expansion over the time period. As shown in Davis et al. (2018), Yelp has become
a considerable source of restaurant information over the same time period as UberX’s en-
tries, although without the sudden availability associated with a stark entry date. As such,
disentangling information from access is a difficult endeavor. Ideally, one would include
time-varying city-wide controls for Yelp’s presence in the main specification, to control for
a cities’ changing information set. Controlling for Yelp’s presence at a more localized level
runs into issues of simultaneity bias, as the two on-line platforms likely amplify the impact
of the other in the post period. For example, we may be more likely to travel to a far flung
restaurant because we learned about it on-line (Yelp amplifying UberX). On the other hand,
we may be more likely to review a new restaurant in a far flung location once access has
improved (UberX amplifying Yelp).
As per Yelp’s updated terms of service, one “may not modify, reproduce, distribute, create
derivative works or adaptations of, publicly display or in any way exploit any of the Yelp
Content in whole or in part except as expressly authorized by us.” This limits my ability
to pull data from the site; however, Yelp has released a dataset of nearly 6 million reviews
for use by the general public. The data contains reviews, user information, and business
information for four of the 34 cities in the sample: Las Vegas, Phoenix, Pittsburgh and
Charlotte. Unfortunately, there is only one year of post data from Las Vegas, making that
city less useful for analysis. Figure A.6.2 shows the share of yelp reviews in inaccessible
areas for Pittsburgh, Charlotte and Phoenix three years around UberX’s entry. While there
does seem to be an increase in the share in the post period, three cities’ worth of data is not
enough to do analysis similar to that in Equation 1.10. The small data size in combination
with the caveats that Yelp data can be manipulated by the reviewed establishments, which
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often pay to solicit good reviews or remove bad ones, make the data a less than optimal
measure of information flow.
Motivated by the Yelp data concerns, we can look for economic rather than statistical
methods to test the information story. Consider two cities, one whose restaurant scene is
tightly concentrated in the center of the city, city A, and another whose restaurant scene is
more dispersed about the city, city B. Residents of city A know a lot about the restaurant
scene in their city; since it is restricted to a small area, it is easy to walk around and find
places to dine. In city B, on the other hand, due to more dispersion, residents may only
be aware of small pockets of dining establishments. Assuming that Yelp provides a bigger
information change in dispersed cities, we would expect more restaurant net creation in
dispersed cities after UberX’s entry, all else equal. To test this hypothesis, I edit the main
specification, running it for each city of the 34 cities separately, including year and zipcode
fixed effects, as well as zipcode trends.
Figure A.6.3 shows a scatter plot of the city-specific UberX impacts on inaccessible area
restaurant flow versus a measure of restaurant concentration. Restaurant concentration is
calculated as the share of land area required to cover 50% of the city’s restaurants in the 5
mile radius. A highly concentrated city has a low concentration measure, and a dispersed
city has a higher one. The results suggest a positive relationship between dispersion and
UberX’s impact (the overall point estimate for the stacked DID is 0.25). On average, a
city with 50% of it’s restaurants in 20% of its area would see 0.16 fewer additional outlying
restaurants added than a city with 50% of its restaurants in 30% of its area, though the
trend line in figure A.6.3 is not statistically different from 0. These results suggest that while
information may play an important story, it cannot account for the restaurant dispersion
in the age of UberX.
Other platforms contributing to restaurant expansion include UberEats, Seamless (later
merged with Grubhub), Grubhub. These services bring food to residential locations, allow-
ing kitchens to locate in cheap areas and primarily make money from delivery orders. None
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of these were launched concurrently with UberX. UberEats launched in March, 2016, while
Seamless and Grubhub launched in the mid-2000’s, so none can explain the kinked event
study estimated around UberX entry.
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A.2. Your Uber has Arrived: Travel Appendix
With UberX changing within-city accessibility, restaurants disperse. Still unknown is how
large this change in travel is that drives dispersion. To measure the change in travel, the
ideal data set would have national representation, utilize the staggered UberX entry, and
track individual trips to restaurants over time. In reality, travel data is much more limited.
Instead, we can look to a few sources of data that cover all of the desired characteristics.
Emissions data from the Environmental Protection Agency tracks emissions associated with
onroad vehicles (ORVs) daily for the entire sample of cities, though it lacks individual trip
accounts. The Taxi and Limousine Commission from New York City provides trip origin
and destination information for all taxi rides from 2009-2018, with ridesharing data added
in 2015. Finally, the confidential data for the National Household Travel Survey provides
trip diaries for survey participants in 2017.
The travel results should not be taken as sufficient evidence that people travel differently
using Uber. Without Uber data on trip counts between locations, we cannot test this
hypothesis; however, it is necessary to show that travel patterns have changed in the post
period as the distribution of activity has changed.
On-Road Vehicle Emissions
Changes in emissions give us an idea of how large the impact of UberX is on travel patterns;
after UberX enters, the restaurant results suggest that people switch from public transit
to driving. It is also possible that the wealth effect can induce more restaurant trips, as
traveling to restaurants has become cheaper, and hence more driving even in non-transit
cities.
Citywide Emissions Changes
To investigate the relationship between vehicle emissions and UberX’s entry, I estimate the
change in various emissions after UberX enters my suite of 34 cities, outlined in Equation
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A.1.
Yicd = α+ βPostcd + ΓCityc + Y eard + Seasond + Trendc + εict (A.1)
Yicd is monitor level emissions for monitor i, in city c, on date d. Postcd is the city-specific
UberX entry date, set to 1 after entry and 0 in the pre-period. The design includes city
fixed effects to control for time-invariant city characteristics, Cityc, year fixed effects to
account for national policy changes, Y eard, and city-by-year trends to control for city level
developments in pollution policy, Trendc.
This equation exploits the staggered entry of UberX across the 34 cities and 4 time periods
to construct a stacked difference-in-difference. The assumption of parallel trends requires
that cities’ emissions output move similarly in their respective pre-periods. Since cities
differ in their emissions policies, I include city fixed effects and time trends; however, all
results are robust to dropping the city trends. Exogeneity of UberX entry requires that
UberX did not enter as it saw emissions changing.
I study carbon monoxide (CO) emissions as on road vehicles (ORV’s) contribute 48% of all
emissions, as shown in Table A.5.9. As a placebo, I study the change in fine particulate
matter (FRM/FEM PM2.5), as ORVs contribute less than 2% of the total output.1 I use
data from the EPA’s Daily Outdoor Air Quality Data at the monitor level from 2009-2018.
Each monitor is identified by it’s latitude and longitude, which I reverse geocode to find
the associated zipcode. I then map these zipcodes to the appropriate cities in my sample.
All analyses is limited to non-exceptional event observations to remove observations during
wildfires or dust storms, for example.
Before implementing the regression in Equation A.1, two important characteristics of the
1These two pollutants represent the largest differences in source share excepting S02: 48.41 vs. 4.5 and 1.79
vs. 17.34 for ORV vs. Industry/Electricity. While the source share difference for S02 is larger than for
PM2.5, it contributes to PM2.5 formation and PM2.5 has been studied more often in the economic
literature.
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data should be noted. Figure A.6.4 panels (a) and (b) show that both pollutants are
falling over the treatment period, so controls for years and city-specific trends are necessary.
Second, panels (c) and (d) show there is a high degree of seasonality masking this overall
negative trends in emissions. All regressions must control for the season of each date. Since
these seasons are tied to weather, they differ from the traditional definitions of annual
quarters, offset by one month.
An additional background note on emissions in the USA over 2009-2018, fracking has
changed the way utilities choose their inputs. As shown in figure A.6.5, the median state
used coal for around 80% of its energy generation in 2009m1. After fracking reduced the
relative cost of natural gas, utilities substituted gas for coal. By 2018m, the median state
used coal for closer to 50% of its energy generation. Natural gas is notably cleaner than
coal to burn, and should result in large declines in particulate matter. At the same time,
since it is cheaper, it may lead to consumers using more energy as their utility bills fall.
In either case, controlling for the ratio of inputs as well as the level of energy generation
is important, especially as utilities contribute much of the total volume of PM 2.5 in the
atmosphere.
Table A.5.10 show the results of regressing various CO measures on a city-specific post
period indicator. The analysis includes year fixed effects to control for national changes in
CO policy, city trends to control for differing trajectories induced by local policies, city fixed
effects to control for time-invariant city characteristics correlated with emissions production,
and season fixed effects to control for emissions’ sensitivity to weather patterns. The CO
measurements are limited to the 8-hour daily averages. Column (1) shows that the average
CO measure increases by 11.5% after UberX enters. Columns (2)-(3) add the state-by-
month controls, ratio and level of inputs used, to capture the advent of the fracking boom.
Because automobiles have not changed their fuel usage due to fracking, and utilities do
not contribute much to CO levels, there is no statistical relationship between the fracking
measures and CO output, as expected. Finally, we can control for monitor level fixed effects,
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to control for highly localized characteristics, such as airports or heavy industry, that might
be correlated with the way people travel within cities. The results remain robust, varying
between 9 and 11.8% rise in CO emissions after UberX entry.
Table A.5.11 show the results of regressing ln(PM2.5) on a city-specific post period indi-
cator. The analysis includes year fixed effects to control for national changes in CO policy,
city trends to control for differing trajectories induced by local policies, city fixed effects
to control for time-invariant city characteristics correlated with emissions production, and
season fixed effects to control for emissions’ sensitivity to weather patterns. The PM 2.5
measurements are limited to the 24-hour daily averages. Column (1) shows that the av-
erage PM 2.5 measure increases by 0.9% after UberX enters, though this is insignificant.
Columns (2)-(3) add the state-by-month controls, ratio and level of energy inputs used, to
capture the advent of the fracking boom. As suggested in the fracking discussion, these
variables predict Pm 2.5 emissions well, especially the ratio of coal used in inputs. Finally,
we can add monitor level fixed effects, to control for highly localized characteristics, such
as airports or heavy industry, that might be correlated with the way people travel within
cities. The results remain robust, varying between 0.3 and 1% rise in CO emissions after
UberX entry, statistically not differentiated from zero.
Figure A.6.6 plots the quarterly event studies. Since UberX enters the cities on 34 different
dates, entry quarter is normalized to 0, allowing cities before entry to control for themselves
post entry, as well as other cities in which UberX has entered. Panel (a) shows that CO
emissions increase in the post period, while panel (b) show that the placebo emission, PM
2.5, sees little change driven by UberX entry and in fact continues to fall in line with the
raw time series plots.
Within City Emissions Changes
We can also look within cities to check whether localized emissions have changed. Due to
data availability, analysis is limited to 12/34 cities. Additionally, because pollutants move
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around in the air, it is harder to distinguish inaccessible air from accessible air, introducing
noise into the within-city analysis. If more trips are taken to inaccessible locations, we should
see an increase in localized emissions in the zipcodes defined to be inaccessible. Equation
A.2 shows the estimation strategy, analogous to the main specification in Equation 1.10,
but with more seasonal controls.
Yicd =δInaccessNic + αPostcd + ΓCityc + βInaccessNic × Postcd+
ΛCityc × Y earcd + ΨInaccessNic × Cityc + Seasond + εict
(A.2)
β measures the percent change in emissions in the post period in inaccessible zipcodes above
their peer accessible zipcodes. Due to local dispersion of emissions, this measure may be
muddied and mis-measured across zipcodes, introducing noise to the highly local measures,
biasing β downwards and also measuring it less precisely. Additionally, most cities do not
have monitors in both types of locations, limiting my sample to only 12 of the original 34
cities.
Table A.5.12 shows the differential growth in emissions for inaccessible zipcodes. As shown
in the second row, the impact of being in the post period remains at 10-11% increase in
citywide emissions, in line with the citywide results. The first row of the table implies that
inaccessible zipcodes saw an additional 8-9% increase in emissions, though this is noisily
estimated due to the drop in sample coverage.
We can do some back-of-the-envelope calculations to estimate the magnitude of this change
in emissions. The Clean Air Act (CAA) legislation originally passed congress in 1963, and
was updated in 1970 and 1977 greatly expanding the federal government’s role in controlling
air pollution. In 1990, the EPA adopted a set of major amendments (CAAA) which provide
the current legal authority for federal programs relating to air pollution today. In 2011, the
EPA produced a report analyzing air pollution emissions under the CAA relative to their
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projected emissions had the 1990 CAA amendments not been introduced. In this report,
the EPA projected that without the CAAA carbon monoxide emissions would have been
80.5 million tons in 2010. With CAAA, actual emissions were 42 million tons, a reduction
of 48%. If this were to be distributed uniformly across the US, so that each city realized
a 48% drop in projected CO emissions, the increase in driving in the post period undoes
a significant fraction of the CAAA reduction: the estimates in table A.5.10 show the rise
in CO is between 1/4th and 1/5th the magnitude of the CAAA decline. Since 48% of CO
emissions come from on-road vehicles, it is likely that changes in travel patterns, for example
switching from public transit to shared cars, is driving the increase in emissions.
Changing Taxi Trips in New York City
The second piece of evidence supporting travel pattern changes uses data from the NYC Taxi
and Limousine Commission. If UberX, and later UberPOOL, has changed the distribution
of amenities in cities, we might also expect the types of trips taken by a close substitute to
Uber, yellow cabs, to also have changed as people travel to new and different destinations.
94% of trips in the data originate in Manhattan, which has always had a thick supply of
travel options; other boroughs have historically had trouble attracting personalized transit
in the form of yellow cabs. This means that yellow cabs are good substitutes for Ubers in
Manhattan. If UberX has opened up new destinations to travelers in NYC, we expect yellow
cabs to make trips to less accessible locations more often as Manhattanites travel farther
than before, knowing they can get back to Manhattan with an Uber. More generally, taxis
co-locate with economic activity; if the distribution of economic activity has changed, taxis
should follow suit.
For data from 2009-2016, TLC provided pick-up and drop-off location latitude and longitude
for all yellow cab trips. They introduced for-hire-vehicle trip details in 2016, but did not
include pick-up and drop-off latitude and longitude, only pick-up and drop-off zones, which
are not conformable with my zipcode treatment sample definition. As such, I limit study
to yellow cab trips. I collect data for the month of January each year from 2009 to 2016,
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and reverse geocode the pick-up and drop-off locations of every trip by looking for the
correct zipcode polygon encompassing each location. Not all latitudes and longitudes can
be matched to a zipcode, but this yields a sample of 109,600,392 trips across 56,571 zipcode
pairs from 934 pick-up zipcodes and 938 drop-off zipcodes. I then collapse the number
of trips by zipcode pair, and merge in my zipcode treatment definitions for both pick-up
and drop-off zipcodes. Because my treatment variable only assigns treated or untreated to
zipcodes within 5 miles of a city center, many of my zipcode pairs are dropped from the
sample. This leaves me with 68,322,472 trips across 2,787 zipcode pick-up drop-off pairs
over 7 years.
I estimate the change in number of trips being picked up in an inaccessible location, dropped
off in an inaccessible location, or being both picked-up and dropped off in inaccessible
locations by yellow cabs over time, as in Equation A.3.
ln(tripsijt) = Y eart + Inaccessi + Inaccessj + Inaccessi × Inaccessj+
β1(t)Inaccessi × Y eart + β2(t)Inaccessj × Y eart+
β3(t)Inaccessi × Inaccessj × Y eart + linkij + ηijt.
(A.3)
Every observation is characterized by a pick-up location, i, a drop-off location, j, and a year
in the sample, t. β1(t) measures the additional percentage of trips originating in inaccessible
locations for each year t relative to those originating in accessible locations. β2(t) measures
the additional percentage of trips ending in inaccessible locations for each year t, relative
to trips ending in accessible locations. β3(t) measures the additional percentage of trips
originating and ending in inaccessible locations for each year t. linkij is a route fixed effect,
effectively controlling for the distance between any two routes. Positive coefficients on each
of the three β′s imply that yellow cabs travel more to, from, or between inaccessible locations
after UberX entry than to, from, or between accessible locations; in short, they measure
102
travel dispersion in the post period using a service substitutable for an Uber. Figure A.6.8
plots the coefficients over time, with 2012 as the base year, the year UberX entered NYC.
Vertical lines are dropped at 2012.75, when UberX entered NYC, and 2015, when UberPool
entered. We see that, after UberX entry, pick-ups in inaccessible locations increased by
approximately 14% on average in the post period, with no discernible pre-trend. Panel (b)
shows that drop-offs in inaccessible locations also increased, by about 9.5% in the post-
period. Finally, trips between farflung areas are the last to respond, only increasing once
UberPOOL enters.
The results suggest that because yellow cabs historically have primarily been available in
Manhattan, riders found it hard to venture into outer boroughs far from public transit
lines. After UberX’s entryWith UberX’s introduction, riders are free to travel to locations
underserved by taxis and public transit, knowing they can hail an Uber home.
Both the EPA daily emissions data and the NYC TLC data support the hypothesis that
city residents travel differently after UberX enters cities. The emissions data show that
emissions rise, consistent with taking longer trips by car or by taking more trip by car (the
wealth effect), or by switching from public transit to cars (substitution effect). On top of
the EPA findings, the NYC TLC data show that people are more likely to travel to and
from transit inaccessible locations in the post period, suggesting movement away from using
the subway or bus lines and towards personalized public transit. As people change their
travel patterns, firms are more willing to locate in these far flung locations, perpetuating
more trips to these locations over time. Putting the restaurant results together with the
NYC TLC and EPA results implies that a 9-14% increase in travel to inaccessible areas is
needed for a 6% (0.25/4.48) increase in restaurant stock, relative to their accessible peers.
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A.3. Your Uber has Arrived: Consumer Theory Appendix
We need to know the spatial distribution of utilities in order to find the maximum trip ij
utility for a given residence, i.
Given than zij is Frechet distributed, V will also be Frechet distributed as it is a mono-






















Define the distribution of utilities for trips along ij as follows:







−ε = e−Φijv−ε (A.5)
where
Φij = Ej(eτmijqβi p
α)−εIεi (A.6)




With the distribution of local utilities in hand, we can calculate the probability that a
resident chooses trip ij over all other trips {is,∀s}. Since this is a binary choice between
any two trips, P (choose ij) = E(choose ij).







where the first term in the integral is the p.d.f. of the indirect utilities, while the second













































































































Now we have the probability of taking trip ij coming from location i.
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A.4. Your Uber has Arrived: NHTS Appendix
The model does not embed a layer of travel mode choice. Instead, we can construct mij =
ηmdriveij +(1−η)mtransitij , where η is the share of trips taken via driving. These trips include
personal vehicles, taxis, and ridesharing. Transit trips include those by any form of public
transportation.
In order to calculate the share of trips driven, we can look to the National Household Travel
Survey (NHTS). The NHTS is conducted every 8 years, the most recent two years being
2009 and 2017, which bookend the pre- and post-ridesharing era. Using data from the two
surverys separately yields an ηpre and an ηpost. Furthermore, the survey identifies the CBSA
in which the trip takes place, providing city-level variation in the shares, ηprec and ηpostc .
To calculate the relevant ηprec and ηpostc , I use data for all home based social and recreation
trips in 31/34 of the cities in my main sample.2 I classify trips taken via car, suv, van,
pickup truck, motorcycle, or rental car as driving trips; trips via public bus, commuter rail,
subway, elevated rail, light rail or street car as transit trips; and trips via taxi, Uber or Lyft
as ridesharing/taxi trips. Driving share, ηtc, is the sum of driving and taxi/ridesharing trips
over all trips. Table 1.1 shows the breakdown of all trips in the sample by travel mode and
year. Over the two periods, driving in personal cars declined, while taxi/ridesharing use
and public transit increased. Regardless of period, nationally, we are a nation of personal
cars.
The table shows the equilibrium ηt; we need the shares due to ridesharing’s entry, exogenous
to any other changes in travel patterns. To get closer to exogenous driving shares, η̂tc, we can
run the simple difference of city-level shares on a post dummy and use the predicted values.
This long-difference specification assumes no other changes to the transportation landscape
than the introduction of ridesharing. This yields mijt = η̂tcmdriveij + (1− η̂tc)mtransitij .
2Colorado Springs, CO, Santa Barbara, CA and Tucson, AZ are missing in the NHTS survey. I use Denver,
CO data for Colorado Springs, Los Angeles data for Santa Barbara, and Phoenix data for Tucson.
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A.5. Your Uber has Arrived: Appendix Tables
Table A.5.1: List of Subway and Light Rail Systems by City
City name Subway Lightrail OnlyBus
Atlanta MARTA X X
Baltimore Maryland Transit Administration X X
Boston MBTA X X
Charlotte CATS: Blue and Gold Lines X
Chicago Chicago "L" X
Cincinnati Bell Connector X
Colorado Springs X
Dallas DART X
Denver Denver RTD X
Detroit Q-Line, People Mover X X
Houston METRORail X
Kansas City KC Streetcar X
Las Vegas Monorail X
Los Angeles Metro Rail X X
Miami Metrorail X
Minneapolis METRO Light Rail X
New York MTA X
Orlando X
Philadelphia SEPTA X X
Phoenix Valley Metro Rail X
Pittsburgh The T X
Portland MAX Light Rail X
Raleigh X
Riverside RTA X
Sacramento Sacramento RT Light Rail X
San Antonio X
San Diego San Diego Trolley X
San Francisco BART X X
Santa Barbara X
Seattle Central Link X
St. Louis MetroLink X
Tampa TECO Streetcars X
Tucson Sun Link X
Washington DC Metro X X
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Notes: This table shows the share of surveyed commuters in each city that commute
via public transit, defined as hc04_est_vc01/hc01_est_vc01 from the 2010 ACS 5-year
estimates, from table S0802.
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Table A.5.3: Restaurant Net Creation: Transit vs. Driving Inaccessible Locations
(1) (2) (3)
Postt× InaccessN,transj × Inaccess
N,drive
j -0.179 -0.290 -0.325
(0.415) (0.494) (0.498)
Postt× InaccessN,drivej 0.238 0.318 0.332
(0.443) (0.502) (0.443)










Postt -0.124 0.191 -0.0620
(0.420) (0.432) (0.359)
R-Squared 0.253 0.270 0.173
Observations 3336 3026 3341
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X
Inc, Edu, Pop X
CBSA FE X
CBSA X Inaccess. X
CBSA X Post X





j ×Postt+yeart+zipj +εjt. All columns
contain the same specification as in column (1) of Table 1.6. Standard errors clustered by
Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.5.4: Restaurant Net Creation Results: Disaggregated Panel by Size Category
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Postt× InaccessNj 0.246∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.0698) (0.0696) (0.117) (0.0764)
InaccessNj 0.241∗
(0.142)
Postt 0.0935 0.00237 -1.025∗∗∗ 0.121
(0.130) (0.0985) (0.244) (0.107)
R-Squared 0.0407 0.0567 0.0814 0.0607
Observations 10023 10023 10023 9084
Year FE X X X X
Zip FE X X X
Zip Trend X
Incjt, Edujt, Popjt X
Notes: This table uses a zipcode by year by employment class size panel, instead of a
zipcode by year panel as in the main results. This table shows the estimates from Yict =
δInaccessic +αPostct + ΓCityc + βInaccessic ×Postct + ΛCityc ×Postct + ΨInaccessic ×
Cityc+εict, in column (2). Additional columns control for zipcode fixed effects, ζic, zipcode
trends, ζic × τ , and year fixed effects, τt from Equation 1.10 in the text. As a final check,
column (4) uses demographic characteristics instead of zipcode level trends to control for
changing residential composition patterns. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in
parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.5.5: Restaurant Net Creation Results: Different City Radii
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 mi. 6 mi. 7 mi. 8 mi. 9 mi. 10 mi.
Postt × InaccessNj 0.744∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.211∗ 0.144
(0.223) (0.196) (0.169) (0.139) (0.124) (0.0996)
Postt 0.00710 0.455∗∗ 0.472∗∗ 0.386∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.220) (0.183) (0.164) (0.145) (0.134)
R-Squared 0.253 0.244 0.240 0.238 0.231 0.225
Observations 3336 4313 5228 6200 7280 8417
Year FE X X X X X X
Zip FE X X X X X X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yjt = βInaccessNj ×Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt,
with the sample covering zipcodes in increasingly wider city radii. Results from specification
as in column (1) of Table 1.6, and use the public transit inaccessibility metric. Standard
errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.5.6: Restaurant Net Creation Results: Dose Response Design
(1) (2) (3)
Postt× mNj 0.0161 0.0137 -0.00417
(0.0101) (0.0111) (0.0127)




R-Squared 0.251 0.268 0.168
Observations 3375 3052 3341
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X
Inc, Edu, Pop X
CBSA FE X
CBSA X Inaccess. X
CBSA X Post X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yjt = βmNj ×Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt, where
mNj is the average public transit time to destination j for the average city resident. Results
from specification as in column (1) of Table 1.6. Standard errors clustered by Cityc×Postct
in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.5.7: Restaurant Net Creation Results: Binned Dose Response Design
(1) (2) (3)
Postt× 2.InaccessNj -0.0442 -0.412 -0.0743
(0.301) (0.392) (0.273)
Postt× 3.InaccessNj 1.517∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.324) (0.245)
Postt× 4.InaccessNj 1.322∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ 1.292∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.403) (0.306)
Postt× 5.InaccessNj 0.891∗∗ 0.622 0.874∗∗
(0.357) (0.423) (0.334)










R-Squared 0.258 0.274 0.202
Observations 3336 3026 3341
Year FE X X X
Zip FE X X
Inc, Edu, Pop X
CBSA FE X
CBSA X Inaccess. X
CBSA X Post X




j (k)×Postt + yeart +
zipj + εjt, where InaccessNj (k) is the quintile of restaurant inaccessibility. Results from
specification as in column (1) of Table 1.6. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in
parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yjt = βInaccessNj ×Postt + γTop5j ×Postt +
δβInaccessNj × Top5j × Posttyeart + zipj + εjt, where Top5j identifies the top 5 cities for
public transit usage, as defined in Table A.5.2. Results from specification as in column (1)
of Table 1.6. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct in parentheses.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.5.9: EPA Air Quality Pollutants in 2010: Pollution Sources
Pollution Source VOC NOx CO SO2 PM10 PM2.5 NH3
% of total output
On-Road Vehicles 18.04 31.87 48.41 0.29 0.74 1.79 7.92
Industry/Electricity 10.27 30.91 4.5 81.4 5.99 17.34 4.14
Notes: This table shows the output of carbon monoxide (CO) due to different pollution
sources, and the share of total output in 2010. Author’s calculations use data from exhibit
1-7, “Summary of National (48 state) Emission Estimates by Scenario Year” in the report
“Emissions Projections for the Clean Air Act Second Section 812 Prospective Analysis,”
February, 2011. Prepared for the Office of Air and Radiation at the U.S. EPA. Prepared
by Industrial Economics, Inc. and E.H. Pechan & Associates, Inc. under EPA contract no.
EP-D-04-006.
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Table A.5.10: Citywide UberX Impact on Carbon Monoxide Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Mean CO) ln(Mean CO) ln(Mean CO) ln(Mean CO)
Postcd 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0323) (0.0329) (0.0280)




R-Squared 0.179 0.184 0.184 0.348
Observations 442354 423724 423724 423724
Stacked DiD Controls
CBSA FE X X X
CBSA Trend X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Additional Controls
Season X X X X
Monitor X X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yicd = βPostcd + Cityc + Y eard +
Trendc + Seasond + εicd. Standard errors clustered by city and post-period.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.5.11: Citywide UberX Impact on PM 2.5 Emissions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Mean PM 2.5) ln(Mean PM 2.5) ln(Mean PM 2.5) ln(Mean PM 2.5)
Postcd 0.00539 0.00605 0.00419 -0.000782
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0164) (0.0175)




R-Squared 0.116 0.116 0.120 0.156
Observations 302066 300290 300290 300289
Stacked DiD Controls
CBSA FE X X X
CBSA Trend X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Additional Controls
Season X X X X
Monitor X X
Notes: This table shows the estimates from Yicd = βPostcd+Cityc+Y eard+Trendc+Seasond+
εicd. Standard errors clustered by city and post-period.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.5.12: Within-City Results for CO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Mean CO) ln(Mean CO) ln(Mean CO) ln(Mean CO)
post=1 × Innaccessible=1 0.0917 0.0906 0.0915 0.0873
(0.100) (0.0793) (0.0795) (0.0776)
post=1 0.116 0.112 0.105 0.108
(0.0873) (0.0823) (0.0807) (0.0795)
R-Squared 0.360 0.354 0.355 0.376
Observations 71112 70230 70230 70230
Stacked DiD Controls
CBSA FE X X X
CBSA X Year X X X X
CBSA X Access X X X X
Additional Controls
Year FE X X X X
Season FE X X X X
Zip FE X X X
Zip Trend X X X X
Monitor FE X
Fracking Controls
Fraction Coal X X X
Gas Gen. X X
Table A.5.13: Within-City Results for PM25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Mean PM 2.5) ln(Mean PM 2.5) ln(Mean PM 2.5) ln(Mean PM 2.5)
post=1 × Innaccessible=1 -0.0150 -0.0143 -0.0169 -0.0168
(0.0210) (0.0243) (0.0247) (0.0245)
post=1 0.0275 0.0290 0.0415 0.0415
(0.0532) (0.0566) (0.0559) (0.0558)
R-Squared 0.129 0.130 0.139 0.140
Observations 43416 42453 42453 42453
Stacked DiD Controls
CBSA FE X X X
CBSA X Year X X X X
CBSA X Access X X X X
Additional Controls
Year FE X X X X
Season FE X X X X
Zip FE X X X
Zip Trend X X X X
Monitor FE X
Fracking Controls
Fraction Coal X X X
Gas Gen. X X
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A.6. Your Uber has Arrived: Appendix Figures
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Years Relative to UberX Entry
Notes: The figure plots Yjt = βInaccessNj × Postt + yeart + zipj + εjt. Yjt is population
change, change in fraction of population with at least a bachelor’s degree, or change
median income in a zipcode.
95% confidence intervals shown.
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Notes: This figure shows the raw share of all Yelp reviews in restaurant inaccessible
zipcodes in Pittsburgh, Phoenix and Charlotte around the 3 years of UberX’s entry into
each city.
















0 .2 .4 .6
Fraction Area to Cover Half of Restaurants in 2010
Linear fit included, slope not significantly different from 0.
All weighted by number of zip codes in each city.
Notes: This figure shows the βct estimated from city level regressions of specification
1.10, including year and zipcode fixed effects, scattered against a measure of restaurant
concentration. Restaurant concentration is defined as the share of a city’s geographic area
within 5 miles of the center required to cover half of the city’s restaurants. The trend
lines regresses the βct’s on restaurant concentration, and cannot be differentiated from 0.
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(b) Annual Average, ln(PM2.5)



















































(c) Daily Mean ln(CO)























































(d) Daily Mean ln(PM2.5)
Notes: Panel (a) plots monitor level daily CO 8-hour arithmetic means, averaged annually
for the 34 cities in the sample. Panel (b) plots monitor level daily PM25 24-hour arithmetic
means, averaged annually for the 34 cities in the sample. Panels (c) and (d) plot the annual
point estimates from
Yicd = βyrelative_yearcd + Cityc +Quarterd + Seasond + Trendc + εict
standard errors clustered by and post-period, 95% confidence intervals shown, panel (c)
plots for ln(CO) and panel (d) plots for ln(PM2.5). Data from the EPA’s daily AQI data.
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Fraction Generation using Coal
2009m1 2018m12
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of fraction coal used in electricity generation,
Coalsm
(Coalsm+Gassm) , over the 50 U.S. states. The figure compares the distributions for 2009m1
to 2018m12. State, s, by month, m, data on coal and gas generation obtained from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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Quarters since UberX Entry
(b) βq
Notes: Panel (a) Plots the monthly point estimates from ln(CO)icd =
βqrelative_quartercd +Cityc +Monthd + Seasond + Trendc + εict standard errors clus-
tered by and post-period, 95% confidence intervals shown. Panel (b) Plots the quarterly
point estimates from ln(PM2.5)icd = βqrelative_quartercd +Cityc +Y eard +Seasond +
Trendc + GasGenicd + FracCoalicd + εict standard errors clustered by and post-period,
95% confidence intervals shown. Panel (b) uses year fixed effects instead of month fixed
effects, which are collinear with the β’s.
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Quarters since UberX Entry
(b) βq
Notes: Panel (a) Plots the monthly point estimates from ln(CO)icd =
βqrelative_quartercd +Cityc +Monthd + Seasond + Trendc + εict standard errors clus-
tered by and post-period, 95% confidence intervals shown. Panel (b) Plots the quarterly
point estimates from ln(PM2.5)icd = βqrelative_quartercd +Cityc +Y eard +Seasond +
Trendc + GasGenicd + FracCoalicd + εict standard errors clustered by and post-period,
95% confidence intervals shown. Panel (b) uses year fixed effects instead of month fixed
effects, which are collinear with the β’s.
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(c) Both in Inaccessible Locations, β3(t)
Notes: The panels plot the event study for ln(tripsijt) = Y eart+Inaccessi+Inaccessj +
Inaccessi×Inaccessj+β1(t)Inaccessi×Y eart+β2(t)Inaccessj×Y eart+β3(t)Inaccessi×
Inaccessj × Y eart + ηijt. Vertical lines are dropped at 2012 and 2015, when UberX and
UberPool were introduced.
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Notes: This table shows the βt estimated from HPIict = Y eart +
∑τ=3
τ=−4{βτInaccessic×
Y earτ} + Cityc × Y eart + ζic + εict. Standard errors clustered by Cityc × Postct. The
shaded area denotes 95% confidence intervals.
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A.7. Global Capital and Local Assets: Tax Policy Appendix
We have identified 10 policy events across five countries that make the U.S. housing market
relatively cheaper to invest in from 2011 to 2018, as summarized in Figure 2.3. In response to
sharply rising house prices, Singapore initiated the first tax on foreign buyers in December
2011. All foreigners and entities (buyers who are not individuals) were charged a 10%
Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) on top of the Buyer’s Stamp Duty levied on all
real estate purchases. In January 2013, Singapore raised the ABSD to 15% for foreigners
and entities, and introduced a 5% ABSD of 5% on Singapore Permanent Residents. The
ABSD increased again in July 2018 to 20% for foreigners, 25% for entities, and 30% for
housing developers.
Hong Kong introduced a 15% buyer stamp duty (BSD) for non-residents in October 2012.
Under the policy, any buyer who was not a Hong Kong permanent resident paid the tax on
top of their purchase price. The policy extended to include companies buying properties,
regardless of their local or nonlocal status. In addition to the purchase tax, Hong Kong
raised the special transactions tax, which is levied on housing sales that occur within three
years of initial purchase, from 10% to 20% to discourage speculation in the housing market.
In November 2016, the Hong Kong government raised the stamp duty for all non first-time
residential property buyers, applicable to both residents and non-residents, from 8.5% to
15%. This effectively raised the taxes paid by foreign parties from 23.5% to 30%.
The state of Victoria, Australia (home to Melbourne) introduced the Foreign Purchaser
Additional Duty, applicable to foreign persons, corporations, and trusts purchasing residen-
tial property (or non-residential property with the intent of conversion) in June 2015. An
additional duty at 3% of the dutiable value (the higher of the price paid for the property
or the market value) was imposed from June 2015 to July 2016. It was subsequently raised
to 7% in July 2016. In June 2016, the state of New South Wales, Australia (home to Syd-
ney) introduced a 4% surcharge purchaser duty (SPD) applicable to residential real estate
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purchases by foreign persons. The state raised the SPD to 8% in July 2017. All duties are
paid on top of the original duties paid by any purchaser of residential real estate.
The provincial government of British Columbia, Canada (home to Vancouver) passed Bill
28 in August 2016, which introduced a foreign-buyer tax, as well as a vacancy tax to specific
communities in B.C. From August 2016 until February 2018, foreign buyers in the Greater
Vancouver Regional District paid an additional 15% of the fair market value in tax. In
February 2018, the tax amount increased to 20% of the fair market value and expanded
geographically. At the same time, the city of Vancouver initiated a vacant homes tax of 1%
of the assessed taxable value on residences not occupied for at least 6 months of the year.
Ontario, Canada’s provincial government implemented the Non-Resident Speculation Tax
(NRST) in April 2017. As per NRST, foreign entities pay a 15% tax on the residential
property value for any property located in the Greater Golden Horseshoe Region of Ontario,
which covers approximately 1/5th of the population of Canada (and includes Toronto).
Most dramatically, in August 2018, New Zealand barred non-residents from purchasing
real estate, excepting Singaporeans and Australians due to existing trade agreements. A
number of national and local governments continue to tighten restrictions for foreign buyers.
In October 2018, Theresa May announced plans to implement a foreign buyer tax in the
United Kingdom, and Governor Andrew Cuomo has included a pied-a-tierre tax in his
proposed 2019 New York State budget. In July 2018, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong
suggested she was open to further policies aimed at limiting non-resident housing purchases.
Figure 2.2 documents the effects of these foreign-buyer taxes on their respective local mar-
kets; all graphs plot house price indexes, and include sales volume when available. For in-
stance, Figure 2.2d displays one of the more recent policy interventions in British Columbia,
and the results in the local housing market. After the enactment of the taxes, the 12-month
sales volume moving average fell by 54% between its peak in February 2016 and March
2019. Although the tax has had little effect on the level of Vancouver housing prices, with
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the 12-month moving average falling only 1%, house price growth has effectively ceased.
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A.8. Global Capital and Local Assets: Reduced Form Appendix
A.8.1. Synthetic Control
In addition to vigorous temporal and geographic controls and the within-city, donut match-
ing estimator, we construct a synthetic control for each treated zipcode. The synthetic
control method builds a synthetic control zipcode for each treated zipcode, using pre-period
demographic, economics and housing market characteristics. This synthetic control need
not map to a real zipcode, and is instead a weighted combination of true zipcodes best
fitting to the relevant treated zipcode. We construct our synthetic controls in a series of
four steps. First, we limit the sample of zipcodes used in control construction to those
within the MSA of the treated zipcode of interest. Next, we restrict to zipcodes with full
histories, using data from 2005q1-2011q4. Third, we restrict the potential control sample
to those with fraction FBC below the 75th percentile, to ensure we do not select all control
zips from those around the treatment threshold. Finally, for each zipcode we generate the
synthetic control using the restricted sample.
Table A.10.3 shows the covariate balance using the synthetic control method. While many
covariates still show statistically significant differences in real economic outcomes such as
establishments and population, the magnitudes are smaller than in table 2.1. Once we
have our synthetic control sample, we again run specification 2.4. We cannot include any
geographic trends as these controls do not have a geography, although they are constructed
within a MSA.
The results of our synthetic control estimation are shown in table A.10.4. Our preferred
specification in column (2) includes quarter fixed effects, and show that house prices in high
foreign-born Chinese share zipcodes rise by 10.8% more than synthetic control zipcodes,
consistent with our primary differences-in-differences results and our matching results.
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A.8.2. Zillow Rent and House Price Data
We replicate the difference–in–differences design for the house price analysis using the Zillow
Home Valuation Index and the Zillow rent Index. Figure A.11.1 shows the raw price and
rent paths for the ZHVI and ZRI for treated and control zipcodes from 2009m1 for ZHVI
and 2011m1 for ZRI. Both series show much higher gains in FBC zipcodes than in control
zipcodes.
Our preferred specification in column (4) of Tables A.10.5 and A.10.6 control for commuting–
zone by time trends. Table A.10.5 shows that average monthly house values are 3% higher
in the post–period in FBC zipcodes than in control zipcodes. This translates to 9% per
quarter, in the ballpark of the results using our constructed HPI, where we find the average
quarterly HPI increase is 8% in treated zips relative to control zips. Table A.10.6 shows
that rents have not been as responsive as house prices, with rents increasing 1.9% more per
month in FBC zipcodes relative to control zipcodes in the post period.
A.8.3. Other Economic Outcomes
A.8.3.1. Employment, Establishment Counts, Payroll
Thus far, the paper has established large price impacts resulting from the influx of foreign
capital. We have not addressed whether these price impacts reflect large enough local in-
vestments to spill over into the real economy; there are a variety of other economic outcomes
tied to the large inflows of international capital. The price results show that house prices
rose on average by 8% in FBC zipcodes in the post period, and the ECF results show that
a 1% increase in ECF increases house prices by 0.6%. Higher house prices can positively
shock local economies through a variety of channels. In this section, we explore results
for real economic outcomes, changes in housing supply, and population and immigration
characteristics.
First, higher housing demand can lead to an increase in construction jobs, raising demand
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for labor and increasing wages. These can spill over to employment in the broader local
economy as more money circulates, driving higher consumption of housing and non-housing
goods alike. Additionally, numerous news outlets have noted a penchant for Chinese firms
investing in local businesses.3 Foreign direct investment from China to the U.S. increased
from $3.3 Billion to $39.5 Billion from 2010 to 2017, a nearly 1100% increase. 4
To test whether the foreign buyer tax policies funneled money into the real economic sector,
we can study the difference-in-differences for zipcode level employment, establishments, and
annual payroll from the County Business Patterns. Table A.10.7 shows the results of this
analysis. Panel (a) shows that employment increases between 0.4 and 1.8% in the post
period, depending on the geographic trends controlled for. Looking to the event study
associated with column (3), figure A.11.2 panel (a) shows that the average treated zipcode
sees more than a 2% increase in employment by the end of 2015, with no action in the
pre-period. Panel (b) in table A.10.7 suggests an increase in establishment count by 1-2%,
but the associated event study suggests this is a continuation of a pre-period trend. Finally,
panel (c) in table A.10.7 shows a 1-2% increase in annual payroll, however these results are
not statistically significant. The figure associated with column (3) in panel (c) of A.10.7,
panel (c) in figure A.11.2, shows that by the end of 2015, annual payroll has risen by just
over 3% for the average treated zipcode, relative to the average control zipcode. Annual
payroll takes a few years to respond, leading to the measured insignificance in the table;
however, by 2015 the growth is borderline significantly different from zero.
Taken together, the real economic results suggest that the influx of capital post-tax has
impacted more than just house prices. An increase in local demand driven by house prices,
or concurrent local investment, has increased employment by 2% and payroll by 3% by





4Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., Foreign Direct Investment Position on a Historical-Cost Basis, U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis
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payroll, the housing demand shock stimulating the local economy seems a better match to
the data than does FDI in local businesses. As FDI tends to be more concentrated in large
factories or industries, it seems reasonable that this cannot be driving such geographically
dispersed real economic growth.
A.8.3.2. Immigration vs. Foreign Purchases
Finally, we check to see whether the rise in house prices in FBC zipcodes seems to be driven
strictly by investment in the housing market, or by the concurrent move of people and
capital, namely immigration. Table A.10.8 checks to see how populations, and population
shares have responded to the foreign buyer tax and capital outflows. Panel (a) checks to see
how local populations, foreign born populations, and FBC populations have changed in the
post-period in FBC treated zipcodes. Column (1) suggests that the total population has
increased by 0.8% on average. This growth seems to come from FBC immigrants, as their
population increased by 4.4% on average, while the total foreign-born population, declines
by 2.2%. These results suggest that FBC locations add very little population, but the FBC
population grows significantly; however, since the number of FBC residents is small in the
pre-period, this 4% growth is not very tangible; the FBC population adds about 2.5k new
residents, relative to the average county population of 1.5 million in the pre-period. This
is reflected in panel (b), which studies how the fraction of foreign born populations change
in the post-period. Column (1) says that the total fraction foreign born has declined by
0.0025, from 0.276 in the pre-period to 0.273 in the post-period. Fraction FBC has increased
from 0.039 in the pre-period, on average, to 0.042 in the post-period; foreign-born Chinese
residents still make up only about 4% of even FBC treated counties. All told, it does not
seem feasible that this increase in prices is entirely due to immigration of wealthy Chinese
to the U.S.; instead foreign ownership of local real estate as an investment property matches
the data better.
Taken altogether, these other outcomes paint a picture of foreign investment in U.S. hous-
ing stimulating local economic demand in the real economy, through the expansion of jobs,
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annual payroll, and the building of new housing units, all for a relatively unchanged popu-
lation. The results are not consistent with immigrants leaving China and setting up local
firms driving our findings.
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A.9. Global Capital and Local Assets: IV Approach Appendix
A.9.1. IV Exclusion Restriction
A plausible violation of the exclusion restriction is that investment in the technology sector
drives house price results. As foreign countries impose foreign buyer taxes, foreigners choose
to invest in U.S. tech stocks instead of in foreign real estate. This leads to economic growth
in tech-heavy cities, which tend to be inelastically supplied with housing, increasing house
prices. Therefore, the tax policy change =⇒ E[εit(FBCi×Postt)] 6= 0, where Postt is the
tax policy change, and the city’s high-tech status is in εit, which is the second stage error
term, and thus correlated with the second stage left-hand-side variable, ln(hpiit).
We test for this mechanism by excluding San Francisco, San Jose and Seattle from our
estimation sample. If tech drives our house prices, the difference-in-difference estimator
should fall to zero. If tech investment is not the destination for all of the foreign capital
and instead it moves into the housing market, the coefficient for our difference-in-difference
estimator should be similar to the unrestricted sample.
Table A.10.9 shows the results when excluding the big tech hubs from our sample. The
point estimats show a 6-13% increase in house prices in treated zipcodes relative to control
zipcodes, in line with our main results showing an 8-17% increase. This shows that Seattle,
San Francisco and San Jose are not driving our results, discrediting this violation of the
exclusion restriction.
A.9.2. Expected Capital Flows, Exposure IV
The ECFit exposure IV scales the per-capita capital flows by the fraction foreign-born of
the respective country within a zipcode. For example, consider two zipcodes with 3 foreign-
born Chinese residents. In the baseline ECFit, each Chinese resident receives the same
per-capita share of the national capital flow from China into the U.S. housing market. The
exposure index scales this per-capita share by the share of Chinese residents in the total
133
population of the zipcode. If the first zipcode has 10 residents, and the second has 100,
















and C = {Canada, China, India, Mexico, United Kingdom, Other}, i denotes zipcode, t
denotes quarter.
Table A.10.14 shows the results using the exposure ECFit. The second stage yields an price
elasticity estimate of 0.85, above but in the same ballpark as our preferred measure.
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A.10. Global Capital and Local Assets: Appendix Tables
Table A.10.1: Housing Characteristics for Transactions in FBC vs. Control Zipcodes
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Control FBC Difference
Price (1000′s) 193.09 535.53 103.47***
(168.06) (255.09) (0.00)
Lot (Acres) 2.97 0.79 -1.87***
(27.73) (2.97) (0.00)
Square Feet 1,645.85 1,690.91 -27.34***
(570.05) (757.89) (0.00)
Year Built 1951 1955 1
(43) (34) (0.20)
Bedrooms 2.65 2.57 -0.28***
(0.85) (1.03) (0.00)
Bathrooms 1.91 2.16 -0.02***
(0.74) (0.91) (0.00)
Garage Spaces 2.24 1.76 -0.17***
(2.26) (1.66) (0.00)
Observations 936,773 13,582 1,053,144
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present raw means for the housing characteristics, with standard errors in
parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (3) shows the difference in means
between FBC and control zipcodes, controlling for commuting zone, with p-values in parentheses.
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Table A.10.2: Matching Covariate Balance
Variable FBC=0 FBC=1 Difference
HPI 1.658 1.753 0.095
(0.838) (0.882) (0.112)
HPI growth, 1 Year -0.018 0.007 0.025**
(0.140) (0.270) (0.010)
HPI growth, 5 Years -0.150 -0.036 0.114*
(0.520) (0.672) (0.058)
Lagged HPI 1.688 1.767 0.079
(0.905) (0.902) (0.123)
Sales 62.406 68.825 6.419
(59.910) (51.408) (10.386)
Lagged Sales 63.410 70.177 6.767
(62.213) (52.984) (10.648)
Permits: Single Family Units 1,296.888 1,101.770 -195.118
(1,814.654) (1,551.373) (122.900)
Permits: All Units 3,179.571 3,270.838 91.267
(3,815.905) (3,040.635) (453.422)
Establishments 639.308 1,059.777 420.469***
(549.566) (763.174) (70.664)
Estab. growth, 1 year 0.002 0.006 0.004
(0.046) (0.029) (0.002)
Estab. growth, 5 years -0.012 0.020 0.031**
(0.118) (0.101) (0.013)
Employment 8,999.520 17,185.475 8,185.956***
(9,426.618) (17,234.313) (1,810.485)
Emp. growth, 1 year -0.011 -0.000 0.010
(0.093) (0.073) (0.008)
Emp. growth, 5 years -0.049 -0.021 0.028
(0.218) (0.190) (0.031)
Annual Payroll (1000s) 407.356 1,171.946 764.590***
(465.063) (1,686.978) (176.334)
2010 Population 29,903.615 33,978.137 4,074.522
(26,508.203) (21,410.336) (3,988.653)
2011 Population 29,592.615 33,515.078 3,922.463
(26,178.000) (21,102.682) (3,945.637)
2011 Median Income 75,604.023 80,449.164 4,845.136
(30,497.830) (35,586.953) (5,591.262)
Notes: This table shows pre-period balance for housing and labor market char-







for zipcode i. Data is zipcode level, excepting permits data, which
is at the county level. Data at the quarterly level, excepting annual employment,
establishment, and payroll data. Data through 2011q3 for the housing and per-
mit data, and through 2012 for the annual data. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by MSA. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.10.3: Synthetic Control Covariate Balance
Variable FBC=0 FBC=1 Difference
HPI 1.854 1.884 0.029
(0.856) (0.933) (0.049)
HPI growth, 1 Year 0.001 0.038 0.037***
(0.197) (0.377) (0.011)
HPI growth, 5 Years 0.281 0.358 0.078
(0.612) (0.824) (0.047)
Lagged HPI 1.890 1.890 -0.000
(0.799) (0.910) (0.039)
Sales 67.583 54.984 -12.599
(58.632) (49.399) (10.288)
Lagged Sales 67.201 55.502 -11.700
(58.778) (49.638) (10.080)
Permits: Single Family Units 2,210.344 2,008.318 -202.025
(3,498.401) (3,524.137) (135.465)
Permits: All Units 4,848.725 5,548.749 700.024*
(6,198.069) (6,481.169) (349.221)
Establishments 705.786 1,056.400 350.614***
(378.453) (750.135) (100.694)
Estab. growth, 1 year 0.001 0.008 0.007**
(0.026) (0.033) (0.003)
Estab. growth, 5 years -0.016 0.027 0.043***
(0.057) (0.104) (0.008)
Employment 9,436.474 17,688.168 8,251.694***
(6,283.615) (17,567.346) (2,464.070)
Emp. growth, 1 year -0.004 0.005 0.009***
(0.054) (0.157) (0.002)
Emp. growth, 5 years -0.031 -0.010 0.020
(0.117) (0.196) (0.015)
Annual Payroll (1000s) 377.082 1,099.842 722.760***
(263.612) (1,560.644) (178.663)
2010 Population 34,189.008 34,651.656 462.648
(20,708.795) (21,402.146) (4,886.639)
2011 Population 33,767.156 34,187.805 420.650
(20,216.633) (21,094.246) (4,834.596)
2011 Median Income 67,904.367 80,136.805 12,232.438***
(16,403.313) (34,968.406) (4,066.386)
Notes: This table shows pre-period balance for housing and labor market charac-







for zipcode i. Data is zipcode level, excepting permits data, which
is at the county level. Data at the quarterly level, excepting annual employment,
establishment, and payroll data. Data through 2011q3 for the housing and permit
data, and through 2012 for the annual data. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
by MSA. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
137
Table A.10.4: Synthetic Control Results
(1) (2)
HPI HPI






Notes: This table shows the coefficient β from hpiit = α + βFBCi × Postt + ζi + θt + εit, using the
synthetic control as FBC. All data at the quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
quarter. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.10.5: Difference–in–Differences Results: Zillow Home Value Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZHVI ZHVI ZHVI ZHVI
Post = 1 X FBC = 1 0.176∗∗∗ 0.0894∗∗∗ 0.0298 0.0344
(0.0160) (0.0227) (0.0330) (0.0340)
R2 0.732 0.841 0.879 0.873
Observations 1473878 980918 439203 465872
Fixed Effects
Month X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Month X
MSA X Month X
Zone X Month X
Notes: This table shows the coefficient β from ZHV Iit = α+βFBCi×Postt+ζi+θt+εit. FBC=1 defined






for zipcode i. All data at the zipcode by month level. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by month, or by geography of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.10.6: Difference–in–Differences Results: Zillow Rent Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZRI ZRI ZRI ZRI
Post = 1 X FBC = 1 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.0684∗∗∗ 0.00397 0.0185∗
(0.00893) (0.0183) (0.0125) (0.0100)
R2 0.730 0.776 0.854 0.847
Observations 1178711 791110 375404 392649
Fixed Effects
Month X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Month X
MSA X Month X
Zone X Month X
Notes: This table shows the coefficient β from ZRIit = α+ βFBCi×Postt + ζi + θt + εit. FBC=1 defined






for zipcode i. All data at the zipcode by month level. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by month, or by geography of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.10.7: Impact on Zipcode Log Employment, Establishments, and Annual Payroll
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp. Emp. Emp. Emp.
Post=1 X FBC=1 -0.000564 0.0179∗∗ 0.0110 0.0112∗
(0.0131) (0.00770) (0.00712) (0.00646)
R2 0.989 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 15163 70890 27673 29966
Fixed Effects
Year X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Year X
Zone X Year X
MSA X Year X
(a) Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Est. Est. Est. Est.
Post=1 X FBC=1 0.00647 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗
(0.00864) (0.00381) (0.00449) (0.00432)
R2 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 15487 75778 28516 31050
Fixed Effects
Year X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Year X
Zone X Year X
MSA X Year X
(b) Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pay Pay Pay Pay
Post=1 X FBC=1 0.0122 0.0233 0.00988 0.0134
(0.0213) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0151)
R2 0.992 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 13149 63151 24118 26265
Fixed Effects
Year X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Year X
Zone X Year X
MSA X Year X
(c) Annual Payroll
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Table A.10.8: Impact on County Level Population and Immigration
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Pop.) ln(Pop. FB) ln(Pop. FBC)
Post = 1 X FBC = 1 0.00791∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0437∗
(0.00469) (0.00558) (0.0225)
Root MSE 0.0269 0.103 0.332
Observations 25140 25033 15222
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(a) Population Changes
(1) (2)
Fraction FB Fraction FBC
Post = 1 X FBC = 1 -0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00374∗∗∗
(0.000223) (0.000107)
Root MSE 0.00412 0.00158
Observations 25140 15222
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Fraction Foreign Born
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Table A.10.9: Results Excluding Tech-Oriented Housing Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPI HPI HPI HPI
Post=1 X FBC=1 -0.0190 0.132∗ 0.0616 0.0636
(0.0523) (0.0632) (0.0451) (0.0569)
R2 0.876 0.901 0.894 0.892
Observations 76547 415221 162542 149673
(a) Results Excluding San Francisco, San Jose and Seattle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HPI HPI HPI HPI
Post=1 X FBC=1 0.118∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.0781∗ 0.0950∗∗
(0.0693) (0.0316) (0.0435) (0.0385)
R2 0.869 0.899 0.889 0.891
Observations 86768 428903 163355 176224
Fixed Effects
Quarter X X X X
Zip X X X X
State X Quarter X
MSA X Quarter X
Zone X Quarter X
(b) Baseline Results
Table A.10.10: ECFit Intuition: 19104 in 2017q1
c FBpop2011ic FBpop
2011
c capflowct, $B V olumeict, $M
Canada 140 811,101 4.75 0.82
China 2175 2,241,390 7.9 7.67
India 754 1,896,640 1.95 0.78
Mexico 220 11,604,684 2.325 0.04
UK 185 688,588 2.375 0.64













{Canada, China, India, Mexico, United Kingdom}, i denotes zipcode, t denotes quarter. In the ta-




Table A.10.11: Expected Capital Flow IV, excluding China: First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
ln(ECF_it) ln(ECF_it) ln(ECF_it)
Post X Frac. FB 0.906∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0963) (0.161)
R2 0.986 0.997 0.995
F 580.4 122.8 47.53
Observations 809656 95629 26446
Fixed Effects
Zip X
Quarter X X X
County X X
Notes: This table shows the first stage results from ln(ECFit) = α + βfrac_FBi × Postt + ζi + θt + εit.
All data mean collapsed at the quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by geography.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.10.12: Expected Capital Flow IV, excluding China: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)
ln(HPI) ln(HPI) Total Units
ln(ECF_it) 0.613∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.00430∗∗∗
(0.0819) (0.139) (0.00117)
Root MSE 1.441 0.186 0.00196
Observations 809059 95609 26446
Fixed Effects
Zip X
Quarter X X X
County X X
Notes:The table shows the second stage results from ln(HPIit) = δ + γ ̂ln(ECFit) + ζi + θt + εit. All data
mean collapsed at the quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography
of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.10.13: Expected Capital Flow IV, Exposure: First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
ln(ECF_it) ln(ECF_it) ln(ECF_it)
Post X Frac. FB 0.846∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0408) (0.0457)
R2 0.968 0.997 0.995
F 5488.9 384.2 282.2
Observations 812746 95643 26446
Fixed Effects
Zip X
Quarter X X X
County X X
Notes: This table shows the first stage results from ln(ECFit) = α + βfrac_FBi × Postt + ζi + θt + εit.
All data mean collapsed at the quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by geography.
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A.10.14: Expected Capital Flow IV, Exposure: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)
ln(HPI) ln(HPI) Total Units
ln(ECF_it) 0.657∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 0.00623∗∗∗
(0.0828) (0.145) (0.00147)
Root MSE 1.437 0.160 0.00182
Observations 812143 95623 26446
Fixed Effects
Zip X
Quarter X X X
County X X
Notes:The table shows the second stage results from ln(HPIit) = δ + γ ̂ln(ECFit) + ζi + θt + εit. All data
mean collapsed at the quarter level. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by quarter, or by geography
of time trend. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.10.15: List of CBSAs from Most to Least Inelastic
Rank CBSA Elasticity
1 Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 0.0174
2 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 0.0298
3 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 0.0298
4 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 0.0311
5 Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA 0.0341
6 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 0.0364
7 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 0.0369
8 Charleston-North Charleston, SC 0.0378
9 Columbia, SC 0.0380
10 North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 0.0382
11 New Orleans-Metairie, LA 0.0393
12 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 0.0397
13 Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.0402
14 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 0.0409
15 Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 0.0413
16 Pueblo, CO 0.0421
17 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 0.0425
18 Las Cruces, NM 0.0453
19 Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 0.0479
20 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 0.0528
21 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 0.0531
22 Greeley, CO 0.0548
23 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.0558
24 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 0.0560
25 Naples-Immokalee-Marco Island, FL 0.0569
26 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 0.0580
27 Pittsburgh, PA 0.0590
28 Knoxville, TN 0.0604
29 Columbus, OH 0.0614
30 Fort Wayne, IN 0.0616
31 Clarksville, TN-KY 0.0642
32 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 0.0657
33 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 0.0659
34 Port St. Lucie, FL 0.0662
35 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 0.0665
36 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 0.0665
37 Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 0.0674
38 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 0.0677
39 Fort Collins, CO 0.0693
40 Colorado Springs, CO 0.0698
Continued on next page
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Rank CBSA Elasticity
41 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 0.0700
42 Evansville, IN-KY 0.0718
43 St. Louis, MO-IL 0.0719
44 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 0.0737
45 Oklahoma City, OK 0.0741
46 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 0.0743
47 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 0.0746
48 Greensboro-High Point, NC 0.0759
49 Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 0.0762
50 Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC 0.0766
51 Lafayette-West Lafayette, IN 0.0766
52 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 0.0772
53 Salt Lake City, UT 0.0796
54 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 0.0813
55 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 0.0832
56 Austin-Round Rock, TX 0.0837
57 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 0.0850
58 Bend-Redmond, OR 0.0865
59 Kansas City, MO-KS 0.0871
60 Madison, WI 0.0901
61 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 0.0907
62 Richmond, VA 0.0927
63 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 0.0943
64 Tucson, AZ 0.0944
65 Tulsa, OK 0.0952
66 Punta Gorda, FL 0.0998
67 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 0.108
68 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 0.108
69 Dover, DE 0.109
70 Columbia, MO 0.112
71 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.113
72 Jacksonville, FL 0.122
73 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 0.124
74 Albuquerque, NM 0.134
75 Raleigh, NC 0.143
76 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 0.149
77 Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 0.156
78 Reno, NV 0.157
79 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 0.160
80 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 0.161
Continued on next page
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Rank CBSA Elasticity
81 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 0.208
82 College Station-Bryan, TX 0.213
83 Boise City, ID 0.213
84 Cleveland-Elyria, OH 0.221
85 Winston-Salem, NC 0.238
86 Laredo, TX 0.251
87 Trenton, NJ 0.267
88 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 0.346
89 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 0.461
90 Ocala, FL 0.604









Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ -0.0468
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A.11. Global Capital and Local Assets: Appendix Tables
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Notes: capflowt defined as $B from China invested in the U.S. housing market, by year t. Source: Trans-
action volume by country from NAR’s annual “Profile of International Activity in U.S. Residential Real
Estate.” Capital outflows from SAFE, time series of balance of payments, and are defined as the quarterly
sum of: 2.2.1.2. Portfolio Investment, 2.2.1.4. Other Investment, and 3. Net errors and omissions.
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